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INTRODUCTION

Ut quod aiis cibus est aifis fuat acre venenum.'
On August 2, 1978, the New York State Commissioner of

Health issued an order declaring the existence of a health emergency at the Love Canal hazardous waste disposal site in Niagara
County. 2 Toxic materials buried in the Canal during the 1940's and

early 1950's had "migrated" into the basements of nearby homes.
Subsequent events at the site became the subject of national pub-

licity. As one writer put it: "Not until the nightmare of the Love
Canal unfolded . .. did Americans become aware of the vast dangers of ground pollution. . . .3
The Commissioner's order concluded that "a great and immi-

nent peril to the health of the general public" existed. 4 As a result,

children under two years of age and pregnant women living adjacent to the site were evacuated. The State acquired 239 homes,
and more than $20 million of public funds were spent in efforts to
contain the migration of hazardous substances. 5 Residents of the
area initiated actions for several billion dollars for personal injury
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., 1952, Antioch College;
J.D., 1955, Yale University. Professor Ginsberg was the Hearing Officer for the New
York State Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes, which was formed after the
Love Canal tragedy came to light.
** J.D., 1981, Hofstra University. Ms. Weiss, an Articles Editor of the Review, assisted Professor Ginsberg in preparing the Hearing Officer's Report for the Interagency Task Force.
1. "[Wjhat is food to some creatures, is to others rank poison." TITUS LUCRETIUS
CARUS, DE RERUM NATURA 326 (Book IV W. Rouse trans. 1975) (On the Nature of
Things).
2. Order of Robert P. Whalen, M.D., Commissioner, New York State Department of Health 9 (Aug. 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Commissioner's Order]. The
need for such an action had been anticipated by the New York State legislature approximately one month earlier, A. 13149, 2 N.Y. ASSEMBLY J. 3639, 201st Sess.
(1978), and was pre-sanctioned by statute. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1385-1388
(McKinney Supp. 1980).
3. Brown, Love Canal, U.S.A., N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § 5 (Magazine), at 23.
4. See Commissioner's Order, supra note 2, at 7.
5. See id. at 8; Statement of Michael J. Cuddy, on-site representative of William
Hennessy, Chairman, Governor's Love Canal Interagency Task Force, at public
hearing before the New York State Senate Comm. on Conservation and Recreation,
Assembly Standing Comm. on Environmental Conservation, Senate Subcomm. on
Toxic Substances & Chemical Waste, Assembly Environmental Conservation Comm.
Task Force on Toxic Substance, and Inter Agency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes
126, 130-31 (Niagara Falls May 3, 1979) (copy on file in office of the Hofstra Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Love Canal Hearings]. The Love Canal Hearings were
held on May 1 through May 3, 1979. For a discussion of early remedial actions, see
OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, N.Y. DEP'T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL, PUBLIC
HEALTH TIME BOMB 18-20 (1978) (report to Governor Carey and N.Y. Legislature)
[hereinafter cited as TIME BOMB].
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and property damage. 6 The Federal Government filed an action for
$120 million in damages, 7 and the State also brought the issue into
court. 8
The ability of the judicial system to provide an efficient mechanism for compensation is uniquely challenged by the claims of

those injured by hazardous wastes emanating from disposal sites.
When toxic wastes migrate into a residential neighborhood, the impact is likely to be greater than that of most other industrial "acci-

dents" in terms of the number of people involved and the effect on
the community as a whole. Homes may be rendered uninhabitable
or their market values appreciably reduced-due either to actual
health risks or the fear of such risks generated by publicity. Resi-

dents of the area surrounding the site may be required to leave
their homes by health authorities or may decide to do so for their

own peace of mind. Often the home will be the owner's only capital asset, subject to a substantial mortgage loan. When it is va-

cated, expenses for substitute shelter will be incurred, while mortgage and real property tax payments continue to come due on the
empty dwelling. Homeowner's insurance policies do not cover

property value loss from nonphysical damage, and the intruding
contaminants will probably leave the structure intact. 9

6. Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 69, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689
(Sup. Ct., Niagara County 1979). Residents and former residents of the Love Canal
area, together with "transients" who visited the area, attempted to file notices of
claim against the City of Niagara Falls, Niagara County, and the Board of Education
of the City of Niagara Falls pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney
1977) (amended 1980). 101 Misc. 2d at 69, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 689. The N.Y. Supreme
Court sitting in Niagara County held that the issue of notice of claim must be dealt
with on a case by case basis. The injuries to the various plaintiffs did not occur at
the same time so that there was no single date from which to measure the accrual of
the various causes of action. Id. at 75, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
7. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, Restitution and Civil
Penalties, United States v. Hooker Chems. and Plastics Corp., No. 79-990, at 40
(W.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 20, 1979).
8. Complaint, State v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 41006 (Sup. Ct.,
Niagara County Apr. 28, 1980). Occidental is the parent of Hooker. Various remedies
are requested, including an order directing defendants to abate the nuisance and
awarding damages of $250 million for injury to natural resources, $95 million for
costs incurred by the State, and $250 million as punitive damages. Id. at 40. In Sept.
1980, a new complaint, identical except for jurisdictional allegations, was filed by the
State in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. The
State was then joined as a party to the pending federal action. The action in the state
court was stayed pending the outcome of the federal litigation. The State received an
answer and counter-claim from the defendants on Oct. 28, 1980.
9. A typical homeowners insurance policy insures against "all risks of physical
loss to the property covered, except as otherwise excluded or limited." Form HO-3
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Residents may suffer both immediate and long-range health
consequences ranging from miscarriages and birth defects to cancer;10 exposure to toxic chemicals may also leave profound emotional scars. 1" Victims may require extensive medical care and
counselling, and may suffer loss of income for prolonged periods of
disability.
The welfare of the community as an entity may be severely affected. Schools may be closed.12 The abandonment of homes or
commercial areas could result in a substantial loss of real property
tax revenues. 13 There may also be a long-term loss of assessable
value of occupied property in and near the contaminated area.
Where family earnings are disrupted, there could be a sudden demand for social services. Local health facilities may be overburdened. The financial consequences to the community of reduced
(emphasis added). This form is currently used in Bronx, Kings, Nassau, New York,
Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties by the
CHUBB Group of Insurance Companies.
10. See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
11. The testimony of present and former Love Canal homeowners at the Love
Canal Hearings, supra note 5, attests to the enormous psychological and emotional
impact which exposure to toxic wastes can have upon young and old alike. The
mother of a 14-year-old girl testified that her daughter became so despondent over
her physical ailments that she attempted suicide. Id. at 425 (statement of Nancy
Rebon). Her older daughter corroborated this testimony. Id. at 393 (statement of
Laurie Nowak).
"Our children talk of being sick and of chemicals hurting us, and of death at
their tender ages. We do not prompt them. We try to hide it, to shelter them. But
they know." Id. at 398 (statement of Laurie Nowak). Another Love Canal resident
testified that:
We will worry of things such as leukemia, cancer, lung damage, allergies,
asthma, liver and kidney disorders, epilepsy, nervous breakdowns, heart
problems and genetic problems until our children are grown and then some.
That's not a pleasant future of fears to have to face.
Id. at 416 (statement of Patricia Grenzy).
[Mly three year old talks of death continuously, even in her sleep. This is
very disturbing to us. I have been told by a counsellor that it all results from
the fears of the canal.
Id. at 419 (statement of Patricia Grenzy).
12. The school on the Love Canal site was closed following the Commissioner's Order, supra note 2. Subsequently another school in the same district was closed
because of percolating wastes. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1979, § 2, at 1, col. 1, at 7, col.
1; id., Aug. 31, 1979, § 2, at 2, col. 5.
13. Special legislation has been enacted to grant partial real property tax exemptions to real estate near the Love Canal that has not been acquired by the State.
The exemptions will be phased out over a five-year period. State aid will be provided to the affected tax jurisdictions in an amount equal to the loss in tax revenues
occasioned by the abatement legislation. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1700
(McKinney Supp. 1980).
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revenues and increased expenses could be devastating, depending
on the size of the taxing jurisdiction and the geographic area affected. The net effect may approximate that of a disaster area in
the aftermath of a flood, hurricane, or earthquake.
Unlike the damage normally accompanying such "natural" catastrophes, however, the consequences of hazardous waste migration are likely to be long term. Contamination of land and buildings may render the area uninhabitable for decades. The human
impact may also continue for years, particularly where the injurious
effects of toxic substances are not revealed until long after actual
exposure has terminated. Governmental emergency relief, while
important, only mitigates short-term consequences.' 4 Even where
the state purchases the contaminated residences, as at the Love
and lost
Canal, most of the major costs in terms of medical care
15
earnings can be recovered only by resort to the courts.
14. See Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1976). This act is
designed to mitigate the immediate hardships caused by widespread destruction. It
assumes that most of the property damage which occurs can be restored and that
there will be few, if any, long-term health effects. The President is authorized to provide rent-free temporary housing and unemployment assistance, but these provisions
expire one year after the major disaster or emergency is declared. Id. § 5174(b). No
reference is made to compensation for long-term health effects.
On May 21, 1980, President Carter declared a federal emergency at the Love Canal which permitted the federal government to pay for the evacuation and temporary
housing of residents. New York Governor Carey complained that this assistance did
not go far enough and requested that the federal government purchase the houses.
Eugene Eidenberg, an assistant to the President, claimed that federal law did not authorize such actions. See N.Y. Times, June 5, 1980, § 2 at 3, col. 1; id., May 24, 1980,
§ 1 at 25, col. 6; id., May 22, 1980, § 2 at 4, col. 2; id. § 1, at 2, col. 1. Subsequently,
apparently spurred by presidential politics, the federal government agreed, on Aug.
22, 1980, to make grants of $7.5 million and loans of another $7.5 million to enable
the state to purchase houses in the Love Canal area so that residents could permanently relocate. See id., Aug. 23, 1980, § 1 at 27, col. 1.
15. The authors recognize that many of those injured will be covered by health
insurance, either privately obtained or provided as an incident of their employment.
Coverage under such policies and programs may be adequate in many circumstances. If there are substantial lost earnings, however, it is unlikely that those injured will have substantial disability insurance. In addition, such policies rarely provide for full reimbursement. Employer disability programs are also limited in
coverage. Governmental sources of compensation for such harms are almost nonexistent.
Relatively few states have addressed the issues of hazardous waste cleanup costs
and the compensation of those harmed. However, a few coastal states have provided
for funds to clean up oil spills. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1411(f)
(Cum. Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.800 (1979); VA. CODE § 62.1-44.34:7 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
However, little headway has been made in providing compensation funds for
damage caused by hazardous materials. Florida legislation provides for remedial ac-
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The courts, having little statutory guidance concerning liability
for hazardous waste injuries, must rely primarily on common law
doctrines. 16 It is our purpose to evaluate the effectiveness of comtion and the payment of damages from pollution that arises from the transfer of certain materials between vessels or between vessels and the land. Pollutant Spill Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12 (Supp. 1981). While originally directed only towards oil spillage, the statute covers, in addition to petroleum products,
pesticides, ammonia, chlorine, and other hazardous materials. Id. § 367.031(7) (1974).
The Florida fund derives its revenue from an excise tax levied for the privilege of
operating terminal facilities and is measured by the volume of pollutants transferred.
The Florida law provides for private parties who have suffered damages to apply to
the fund within six months after the cause of action arises. However, the department
can, if good cause is shown, waive the statute of limitations. Id. § 376.12(2) (Supp.
1981). An earlier version of the Florida act, passed in 1970, set no ceiling on industry
liability, and caused much consternation in oil and oil-related industries. Id. § 376.12
(1974) (amended 1974). After the 1970 law was passed, shippers refused Florida
business or required their Florida contractors to hold the shipper harmless for any
spills occurring in Florida waters. The statute was amended in 1974 to set a ceiling
on a potential defendant's liability. See Barrett & Warren, History of Florida Oil
Spill Legislation, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 309, 314, 318, 337 (1977).
The New Jersey Spillage Compensation Fund is liable for cleanup costs and
property damage resulting from the discharge of hazardous substances on water or
land. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a-z (West Supp. 1980). Compensation does not include medical costs or loss of income, unless the loss of income is due to damage of
real or personal property. Id. § 58:10-23.11g. Private claims against the fund must be
made within one year after discovery, but no later than six years after the pollutant
discharge originally occurred. Id. § 58:10-23.11k.
New York law, similar to the New Jersey statute, is applicable only to discharges
of petroleum. N.Y. NAV. LAW §§ 170-204 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
Maine also has created a compensation fund. Maine Coastal Protection Fund,
ME. REV. STAT., tit. 38, §§ 551-552 (1978 & Supp. 1979). The revenues are generated
by license fees for oil transferred, penalties, and other fees and charges. Polluters are
held strictly liable for the damages they cause. Private parties can collect from the
fund for damage to real and personal property and for loss of income directly or indirectly caused by an oil discharge. Id. § 552(2) (1978).
A federal study has characterized such state statutes as "exceptions to the general pattern of inaction which characterizes state response to this problem." INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT 27 (1979) (prepared by J.

Moorman, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Div., Dep't of
Justice). An intensive federal study of compensation experience in six states concludes that "the legal mechanisms in the states studied are generally inadequate for
redressing toxic substances-related harms." SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN,
MISSOURI, NEw JERSEY, AND TEXAS XII-XV (Comm. Print 1980).

16. Existing federal legislation has been directed toward regulation of waste
disposal practices, rather than issues of compensation. See Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6907. Most state legislatures apparently assume that common law liability doctrines are adequate for the task of
compensating victims of hazardous wastes. New York has provided that responsibility for carrying out remedial programs shall be determined "according to applicable
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mon law approaches to liability for personal injury and property
damage arising from hazardous waste disposal sites. Since a doc-

trine's utility can best be measured in the context of a particular
fact situation, we will use the facts of the Love Canal tragedy, to

the extent that they are known, as a backdrop for our analysis. As
will be shown, common law recovery for injuries arising in this

context is uncertain. In addition, litigation in such situations is
likely to be protracted and expensive. Thus, victims of hazardous

waste disposal will be poorly served by the common law and the
judicial process. We conclude that, in view of the enormous poten-

tial for prolonged and widespread harm which land-burial sites
pose, federal legislation creating an administrative remedy should
be enacted.
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL SITES: THE NATURE
AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Hazardous waste, a byproduct of society's industrial processes,
has been defined as waste "which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality
or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of or otherwise man7
aged."'
principles of statutory or common law liability." N.Y. ENviR. CONSERV. LAW §
27-313(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1389-b(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1980). Maryland has curious legislation with respect to injury from oil spills
which provides, "The person responsible for the oil spillage shall be liable to any
other person for any damage to his real or personal property directly caused by the
spillage." MD. NAT. RES. ANN. § 8-1409 (1974) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs, defendants and courts are left to their own devices to determine the meaning of "respon-

sible."
17. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). However, the difficulties of definition are
illustrated by the conclusion of the Toxic Substances Strategy Committee of the
Council on Environmental Quality:
"Toxic" is a relative term. The effects of any chemical substance or mixture
depend not only on its composition and basic properties but also on dosage,
route and conditions of exposure, susceptibility of the organism exposed,
and other factors. It is not possible to categorize all chemical substances as
"toxic" or "nontoxic," although some are more toxic than others during normal conditions of use and exposure, and some are generally innocuous.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ToXIc CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION iv n.1 (May 1980).
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While the volume of such substances currently being produced can
only be approximated, a federal study concluded that the nation
will generate approximately 56 million metric tons of hazardous
waste in 1980.18
In recent decades, waste materials have grown increasingly
complex and harmful to the environment and human health.
Traditionally, wastes have been disposed of by incineration, discharge into bodies of water, or land burial. However, national concern for abating air and water pollution has resulted in legislation
and regulatory programs encouraging land disposal. 19 Although the
exact number of hazardous-waste disposal sites in the country is
unknown, a study done for the Environmental Protection Agency
placed the figure at over 50,000.20 The most intensive study of the
subject was conducted in Erie and Niagara counties in New York
State following the Love Canal tragedy. 21 A total of 215 land-

18. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE: GREATER EFFORTS ARE
NEEDED 1 (CED-79-14, Jan. 23, 1979) (Report to Congress). The source of this pro-

jection is given as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). That agency esti-

mated that 35 million metric tons per year of hazardous waste will be subject to regulation. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,946-47 (1978).
The Comptroller General also found that "[n]one of the officials in the 26 States
visited or contacted knew the exact volume of hazardous waste generated in their
States, and none of the States could adequately account for the disposition of these
wastes." COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 5.
19. Issues of air pollution were addressed in a comprehensive manner on the
federal level by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976). A similar approach to water pollution was taken in the Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1151 (1976). Most methods of air pollution control and water treatment result in the creation of sludges, pollutants removed from the air and water, which require disposal. As a result, the volume of materials requiring land disposal has increased. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (1976). RCRA, a national approach to the
regulation of land disposal, was adopted in 1976, but the necessary regulations were
slow in being issued. Litigation was initiated in Sept. 1978 in order to force the EPA
to implement the act. Illinois v. Costle, 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1979);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Plehn, No. 78-1715 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 13, 1978).
20. See FRED. C. HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP
COSTS FOR NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS 22 (1979) (report of work per-

formed for Office of Solid Waste, EPA, contract no. 68-01-5063) [hereinafter cited as
HART REPORT]. "The total of 50,644 sites is therefore a very rough estimate of the
number of active and inactive sites that contain hazardous wastes and (by virtue of
this characteristic alone) may pose an environmental or health threat." Id. (emphasis
in original).
21.

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON HAZARDOUS WASTES, DRAFT REPORT ON

HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL IN ERIE AND NIAGARA COUNTIES, NEW YORK (1979)

[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. The Task Force was established by or-

der of Peter A. Berle, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environ-
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disposal areas were identified in the two counties, of which 36 sites
definitely received large quantities of hazardous wastes and 116
may have received significant quantities.2322 Of the 215 sites, 126
(including the Love Canal) were inactive.
The risks posed by a hazardous waste disposal site depend
upon factors such as the nature, quantity, and condition of the material deposited, the geological and hydrological conditions at the
site, and the proximity of populated areas. Liquid and solid wastes
may be dumped into a landfill either directly or in containers. Although containers may decrease immediate risks, they often deteriorate before their contents have lost their toxicity. 24 Hazardous
substances may migrate from a landfill, carried by percolating surface waters or groundwater, or may escape to the atmosphere in
the form of gases and vapors. 25 If the waste is contained in soils or
clays of low permeability and covered with similar materials capable of diverting surface water, the risk of migration is substantially
reduced. 26 In recent years, plastic membranes have been used to
27
line and cover fill sites, but their long-term value is questionable.
Land-disposal sites have also been provided with leachate collection and treatment systems and facilities for monitoring the quality
of adjacent ground and surface waters. 28 These precautions, howmental Conservation on November 20, 1978. It was composed of three representatives of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, four of the
New York State Department of Health, and three of the Region II Office of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at Introduction.
22. Id. at II-1 to -2.
23. Id. at II-1. An inactive site is one in which waste is no longer being deposited. In most instances an earth and vegetation cover will have been established over
the wastes making their nature and exact location difficult to ascertain. Many such
sites are currently owned by parties having no connection with the prior disposal activity. See Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings before the Senate
Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Comm. on

Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 325-26 (1979) (pt. 1) (statement of Rep. John J. LaFalce, N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Hearings].
24. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-75 to -76.
25. See T. SHEN & T. TOFFLEMIRE, AIR POLLUTION ASPECTS OF LAND DISPOSAL OF Toxc WASTE (Technical Paper No. 59, 1979) (authors are Research Scientists with New York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation, Division of Air Resources and Bureau of Water Research respectively).
26. See note 129 infra.
27. A. GESWEIN, LINERS FOR LAND DISPOSAL SITES 8, 23 (1975) (EPA/530/SW137); H. HAXO, EVALUATION OF LINER MATERIALS EXPOSED TO LEACHATE (1976)

(second interim report, EPA-600/2-76-255). Both studies were written for the Municipal Environmental Research Laboratory, Office of Research and Development. U.S.
E.P.A. Cincinnati, Ohio.
28. A. GESWEIN, supra note 27, at 2-3.
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ever, have been sporadically taken. Moreover, many substances remain hazardous for hundreds or even thousands of years, and require long-term maintenance and supervision. In addition, there is
an impressive array of threats to the integrity of the most carefully
designed land-burial site: Storms, earthquakes, floods, burrowing
animals, tree roots, household pets and human error all contribute
to the conclusion that "[tlhere is no such thing as a Csecure
landfill.' "29
The Love Canal is the nation's most widely publicized example of the consequences which can result from the land burial of
toxic wastes. The site is, however, merely a symptom of a national
disease which transcends the particular situation in Niagara Falls.
Environmental pollution is a concomitant of our industrial era; in
years to come, it may manifest itself in injuries as yet unforeseeable. While the Love Canal is a useful springboard for examining the efficacy of common law remedies available to victims of
buried wastes, the ultimate question raised by that tragedy is more
universal: How will our society accommodate the costs of industrial
pollution?
THE LoVE CANAL

In 1894, William T. Love began to excavate a navigation and
power canal between the upper and lower levels of the Niagara
River. The project was soon abandoned.30 In the early years of the
20th century, the open ditch, located in the southeast comer of the
City of Niagara Falls may have served as a swimming hole. 31 In
1942, the Hooker Electro Chemical Company (Hooker) entered
into an agreement to purchase the canal site from the Niagara
Power and Development Company, the then owner. Pending the
closing of title, Hooker was granted permission to "deposit fill" in
the excavation. 32 Hooker took title from Niagara Power and Devel29. Love Canal Hearings, supra note 5, at 352 (statement of C.N. Richardson);
see T. SHEN & T. TOFFLEMIRE, supra note 25, at 12-16. The authors conclude that
"[tihe actual destruction of the toxic components of the waste may be a better choice
than placing them in a landfill where they may end up being a 'time-bomb.'" Id.
at 21.
30.

TIME BOMB, supra note 5, at 3.

31. Id. Other accounts of the history of the sites are in M. BROWN, LAYING
WASTE (1980); Brown, Love Canal and The Poisoning of America, THE ATLANTIC,
Dec. 1979, at 33, 34-35.
32. Letter from Wilton McK. Taylor, President Niagara Power and Development Company, to Hooker Electrochemical Company (Apr. 15, 1942) (copy on file in
office of the Hofstra Law Review).
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opment in 1947, 3 3 and continued to use the canal to dispose of
chemical wastes until 1953. In that year, the company "sold" the
16 acre property to the Board of Education of the City of Niagara
34
Falls for $1.00 for use as an elementary school site.
Hooker's generosity in donating the land for educational purposes was, however, shaded by caution. The deed, in addition to
informing the School Board that "the premises . . . have been
filled, in whole or in part, to the present grade level thereof, with
35
waste products resulting from the manufacturing of chemicals,"
contained exculpatory language providing that "the purchaser assumes all risk and liability incident to the use thereof [and] no
claim, suit, action or demand of any nature whatsoever shall ever
be made . . . against the [grantor] for injury to a person . . . or
loss of or other damage to property caused by . . . said industrial
waste." 3 6
Notwithstanding these warnings, explicit and implied, the
Board of Education constructed an elementary school. There is
some confusion concerning the condition of the site at the time it
was transferred to the Board of Education. The deed quoted above
stated that the Canal was filled with chemical waste extending "in
whole or in part" to the level of the surrounding land. This is corroborated by the findings of an independent study conducted for
the City of Niagara Falls in 1977, which concluded that "the
depths of soil cover over drums range from zero cover to about 6
feet."3 7 An earthen or clay "cap" may have been placed over the
materials. 38 However, the existence of such a cap appears incon33. Deed from Niagara Power and Development Co. to Hooker Electrochemical Co. (Apr. 29, 1947) (recorded Apr. 30, 1947 in Niagara County Clerk's office in
Liber 867 of deeds at p. 591). A correction deed between the same parties dated
Dec. 18, 1947 was subsequently filed for the sole purpose of correcting Hooker's
state of incorporation from Delaware to New York. See Liber 897, supra, at 547.
34. Deed from Hooker Electrochemical Co. to the Board of Education of the
School District of the City of Niagara Falls, New York (Apr. 28, 1953) (recorded July
5, 1953 in Niagara County Clerk's office in Liber 1106 of deeds at p. 467). The transfer was, in effect, a gift-perhaps the most expensive gift since the Trojan horse.
35. Id. at 468.
36. Id.
37. R. Leonard, P. Werthman & R. Ziegler, Characterization and Abatement of
Groundwater Pollution from Love Canal Chemical Landfill, Niagara Falls, N.Y. 2
(Aug. 1977) (prepared for City of Niagara Falls by Calspan Corp., Buffalo, N.Y.) (copy
on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Calspan Report].
38. TIME Boim, supra note 5, at 3 states that "[aifter 1953, the site was covered
with earth." Another study, however, refers to a one to three foot clay "cover."
Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., Phase I Pollution Abatement Plan-Upper Ground-
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sistent with findings that chemical wastes were exposed to the ele39
ments at the surface of the landfill.
When Hooker began to use the Love Canal as a waste disposal
site, the surrounding area was relatively undeveloped. 40 After the
Board of Education took title, however, homes were constructed in
the vicinity, some immediately adjacent to the landfill area. 41 During the construction of the elementary school in 1955, there were
problems with chemicals buried at the site.42 Subsequently, in the

water Regime Love Canal Chemical Landfill 4-6 (June 1978) (prepared for City of
Niagara Falls by Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., Waterloo, Ontario, Canada) (copy on
file in office of the Hofstra Law Review). An earlier report, R. Leonard, P. Werthman
& R. Ziegler, supra note 37, makes no reference to an earth or clay cover and finds
facts inconsistent with the existence of such a cap.
39. See R. Leonard, P. Werthman & R. Ziegler, supra note 37, at 2, 9.
40. An aerial photograph taken in 1938 and supplied to the authors by the Photography Unit of the New York State Department of Health, Division of Laboratories
and Research shows the Love Canal excavation filled with water and shows surrounding roads and fields. Residential construction has occurred approximately three
blocks east of the Canal, but not to the north or west. The site is bounded on the
south by Frontier Blvd. No. 2359, Division of Laboratories and Research, N.Y. State
Dep't of Health.
41. The development may, in part, have been stimulated by the presence of the
new elementary school. There is a conflict as to whether any homes were built on
the land formerly owned by Hooker. On the one hand, Michael J. Cuddy,
Coordinator of the Love Canal Task Force, stated that "[t]he property not required
for the school's purposes was sold to developers and speculators." M. Cuddy, The
Love Canal Toxic Chemical Waste Dump Site 1 (written statement submitted at
Love Canal Hearings,supra note 5).
An investigation conducted by A.J. Woolston-Smith of the Investigations unit of
the New York State Assembly indicates that Hooker does not appear in the chain of
title of deeds for area homes. Letter from Paul T. Wells, On-Site Coordinator Love
Canal Task Force, N.Y. State Department of Transportation, to Peter J. Millock, Director, Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes (May 15, 1979). In addition,
Hooker has stated publicly that no homes were built over the site. See Environmental Hearings,supra note 23, at 296 (statement of Hooker Chemical Co.).
It appears to the authors, from a site visit and an aerial photograph of the Love
Canal area taken on Nov. 24, 1974, and supplied to the authors by the Photography
Unit, Division of Laboratories and Research, New York State Department of Health,
that numbers 400-514 and 680-794 on 99th Street and 703-799 and 903-995 on 97th
Street may be located on the land formerly owned by Hooker.
The confusion on this issue is compounded by the "Findings of Fact" in the
Commissioner's Order, supra note 2, which states that "[the City of Niagara Falls
Board of Education subsequently [after 1953] sold part of the site to others," id. at 4,
yet concludes that the site is currently owned by the Board of Education, the City of
Niagara Falls, and one L.C. Armstrong. Id.
42. A resident of the Love Canal area has testified that "they had to know the
severity of the problem when they began building the school and had to stop and
vote on moving the school over 60 feet because of noxious fumes and chemicals
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late 1950's, children playing in the schoolyard suffered injuries
which were brought to the attention of Niagara City officials and

Hooker. 43 These incidents appear to have taken place on the site
itself, and there is no indication that migration had yet occurred.

In 1968, a highway (The LaSalle Arterial Expressway) was constructed to the south of the Love Canal, requiring the relocation of

Frontier Avenue, now the southerly border of the site. In the
course of construction, chemical wastes were excavated. Property

owners complained about the "stench" emitted by the materials.
Hooker was consulted and approximately 1800 cubic yards of
chemicals were removed."

At some time after the chemical wastes were deposited in the
Canal excavation, they began to migrate away from the site, carried
by percolating groundwater. An understanding of this movement
requires a digression to consider local geologic conditions. At the
Canal, there is limestone bedrock approximately 40 feet below the

surface of the ground. Above the bedrock is 15 to 20 feet of compact, loamy glacial till of low permeability. The next highest stratum (the clay layer), the one into which the Canal was originally
dug, consists of 15 to 20 feet of silts and clay of very low permesurfacing and jeopardizing the health of the construction workers .
Love Canal
Hearings,supra note 5, at 384 (statement of Debra Cerrillo).
43. Hooker Chemical Co. admits that there were "some isolated incidents in
the late 1950's" at which time "[a] few children playing in the area were slightly
burned by some of the chemicals." Hooker contends, however, that the cause of
these "incidents" was "ill-advised road construction." Letter to the Editor of the
New York Times from Donald L. Baeder, President, Hooker Chemical Co. (Aug. 10,
1979) (published N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1979, at 18, col. 1), and reproduced in a full
page advertisement by Hooker Chemical. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1979 at D3. Hooker
may be confusing the incidents which appear to have occurred "in the late 1950's"
with subsequent problems caused by major highway construction which took place
in 1968. See note 44 infra and accompanying text. The company's own testimony on
this point is contradictory. Bruce Davis, President of The Industrial Chemicals
Group of Hooker Chemical Co. has stated publicly that the children were exposed to
chemicals because the clay cover was removed by the Board of Education. Love
Canal Hearings,supra note 5, at 86-87 (statement of Bruce Davis).
44. This episode was investigated in the summer of 1978 by D.H. Ketchum,
Regional Director, N.Y. State Department of Transportation, Region 5. On August 9,
1978 he rendered a detailed report to W.C. Hennessy, Commissioner of Transportation. A copy of that report, with exhibits annexed, is in the possession of the authors.
One of those exhibits is a memorandum dated March 22, 1968 from K.L. Reitmeier,
Supervising Soils and Materials Engineer, to Joseph P. Cain, Engineer in charge,
N.Y. State Department of Transportation. Mr. Reitmeier notes that "[i]f the [chemical
waste] material were allowed to remain there is always the possibility that the
toxious [sic] fumes could follow service connections into dwellings resulting in legal
implications."
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ability. Finally, the 4 to 6 feet of soil immediately below the sur-

face consists of more permeable silts and fine sands. 45 When rain
and surface water soaked down into the Canal excavation, it was

largely contained by the clay layer, as if the excavation were a giant bathtub. As the water rose, however, it eventually reached the

surface-soil stratum, and "spilled over" the clay "bathtub," carrying
chemicals into the permeable soil. 4 6 This leachate, 4 7 containing organic compounds, migrated laterally in the permeable soil layer
until it reached the basements of homes adjacent to the Canal. 48
More than eighty chemical compounds have been identified at
the site.4 9 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
identified twenty-six organic compounds in air samples taken from

the basements of fourteen houses adjacent to the site. 5 0 In July
1978, the N.Y. State Health Department tested for ten specific
compounds in air samples from the basements of eighty-eight
houses surrounding, but not adjacent to, the Canal. Each of the

components was found in some of the homes; one was present in
45. See Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., supra note 38, at 3; Calspan Report, supra
note 37, at 16. Commissioner Whalen appears to have erroneously taken Calspan's
figures showing the distance below the surface of the strata and used these to show
the thickness of the strata. Commissioner's Order, supra note 2, at 5 (Finding of Fact
14).
46. See Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., supra note 38, at 6-7. It is also possible that some of the chemical leachate entered the deeper permanent ground water
table. See Calspan Report, supra note 37, at 10.
The canal excavation was originally approximately 10 feet deep. Thus the bed of
the canal was in the silty-clay layer with low permeability. It appears, however, that
during the period of Hooker's ownership the southern portion of the site was excavated to within a few feet of the bedrock, thereby extending into the somewhat more
permeable glacial till. Conestaga-Rovers & Assocs., supra note 38, at 6-7.
47. Percolating water contaminated by dissolved soluble materials, liquids, and
suspended solids. A. GESWEIN, supra note 27, at 2.
48. Commissioner's Order, supra note 2, at 5 (Finding of Fact 16). "[Tlhe upper 10 feet of soil ... was interlaced with a network of pores which were the result
of decayed organic matter such as root systems and a fracture network which is the
result of weathering .... Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., supra note 38, at 6. The report concluded that lateral migration of liquid waste had taken place through this upper layer, confirming the same finding in an earlier report. Id.; see Calspan Report,
supra note 37, at 16. More recent consideration of the issue indicates that this view
of the migration of the toxic materials may be over-simplified. It has been suggested
that leachate seeped through fissures in the clay wall of the Canal and followed old
stream beds that intersect the Canal and are filled with permeable materials. See
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE

DISPOSAL 12 (Comm. Print 1979).
49. Commissioner's Order, supra note 2, at 5 (Finding of Fact 17).
50. Id. (Finding of Fact 18).
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93% of them. 5 1 Seven of the substances identified are carcinogenic
52
in animals, and one, benzene, is a known human carcinogen.
The State Health Department found that there was a significant increase in spontaneous abortions (miscarriages) among women
who resided in a particular area adjacent to the Canal, and that the

overall risk of miscarriages among all female residents of the Canal
vicinity was greater than normal. In addition, congenital malformations were found in five children of parents residing adjacent to the
Canal. 53 No indication was given, however, whether this incidence
of malformation was excessive in terms of normal statistical proba-

bility. The Department concluded that further studies were necessary to "delineate chronic diseases afflicting all residents who lived

adjacent to the Love Canal landfill site, with particular emphasis
on the frequency of spontaneous abortions, congenital defects, and

other pathologies, including cancer. . ..

.54

A study conducted by Beverly Paigen, a cancer research scientist at Roswell Park Memorial Institute in Buffalo, New York, was

more specific in its conclusions. 55 Dr. Paigen found that residents
51. Id. (Finding of Fact 19).
52. Id. at 6 (Finding of Fact 20). The following wastes were deposited in the
canal:
Estimated Total
Tonnage
Type of Waste
Misc. acid chlorides (20)
Thionyl chloride (17)
Misc. chlorinations (19)
DDM (15)
TCP (16)
Benzoyl chloride (7)
Metal chlorides (11)
LDS/MCT (9)
BHC (5)
Chlorobenzenes (6)
Benzyl chlorides (1)
Sulfides (3)
Misc. 10% of above
Total

400 tons
500 tons
1,000 tons
2,400 tons
200 tons
800 tons
400 tons
700 tons
6,900 tons
2,000 tons
2,400 tons
2,100 tons
2,000 tons
21,800 tons

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 111-72 to -73. For a chemical analysis of

water taken from storm sewers and basement sumps, see Calspan Report, supra note
37, at 8. Their findings show high concentrations of PCB's, and they conclude that
"PCB's are actively being leached from the Love Canal area." Id. at 10. These findings are confirmed by those of Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., supra note 38, at 8-9.
53. Commissioner's Order, supra note 2, at 6-7 (Finding of Fact 23).
54. Id. at 8.
55. B. Paigen, Health Hazards at Love Canal (Mar. 21, 1979) (testimony pre-
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of homes located on or near old stream beds in the Love Canal
neighborhood experienced increased health problems. In particular, she found an above normal incidence of "miscarriages, birth
defects, nervous breakdowns, asthma and diseases of the urinary
system." 56 A more recent survey by the EPA determined that the
possibility of contracting cancer may be as high as one in ten for
residents living adjacent to the Canal, while the odds drop to one
in one thousand for those living a few blocks away.5 7 Although it is
apparent that toxic materials escaping from the Love Canal had adverse effects on the health of the surrounding population, further
studies may be necessary to prove individual injury.
COMMON LAw LIABILITY FOR INJURY ARISING FROM
WASTE DisPosAL SITES

HistoricalPerspective
At many hazardous waste disposal sites, as at the Love Canal,
injury will be produced through the medium of percolating water.
A brief review of the evolution of common law rules pertaining to
groundwater pollution is necessary to understand the somewhat
contradictory cases which will serve as precedents in such situations. The policies underlying these cases reveal a tension between
individuals and corporations and between residential or agricultural
land use and industrial land use which continues today.
When the common law was developing, England was primarily an agrarian society in which rights in land were zealously protected. English courts tended to look to the nature of the injury in
order to determine the plaintiffis right to a remedy, rather than to
sented on Mar. 21, 1979 to Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of House of Representatives) (copy on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
56. Id. at 1. Dr. Paigen's study is referred to extensively in SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FORIEGN

COMMERCE, supra note 48, which notes that "[a] major dispute exists between the
survey conducted by Dr. Beverly Paigen ... and that performed by the New York
State Health Department." Id. at 15. Dr. Paigen found that women in homes located
in wet areas near the Canal had miscarriage rates of 25 percent, compared to 8.5 percent among women moving into the area. They had a 20 percent incidence of birth
defects compared to 7 percent in nearby dry areas. Of 16 children born in wet areas
from 1974 through 1978, 9 had birth defects. Dr. Paigen also found a substantial increase in suicides, hyperactive children and convulsive disorders such as epilepsy.
Id.
57. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, at 71, col. 3.
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the culpability of the conduct causing the harm. 58 Thus, activities

interfering with another's exclusive possession of land or use of
land for agrarian purposes were subjected to strict liability, even

for what in the modem context would be considered unavoidable
accidents. 59 Because the use and value of land usually depended
upon access to quantities of pure water, a separate category of

rights and obligations arose dealing with water flowing on the surface of the earth or beneath the surface in established water-

courses. 60 Percolating groundwater, 61 on the other hand, was considered inseparable from the land itself, and, therefore, the maxim

cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos62 applied,
giving landowners absolute ownership of all water resting beneath
63
or filtering through their soil.

This maxim, in combination with an equally famous aphorism, 63 sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,64 produced a complex

system of water law which distinguished between quantity and
quality. It protected landowners, who, in pumping percolating

water from beneath their property, drained away the underground
supply relied upon by their neighbors. However, landowners who

polluted their groundwater were held strictly liable for injuring
58. VIII W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 467-68 (1926).
59. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29, at 140 (4th ed. 1971). "An unavoidable accident is an occurrence which was not intended, and which, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exericse of reasonable
precautions." Id. (footnote omitted).
60. These waters were governed by the law of riparian rights which gave every
owner of land bordering on or transversed by a natural watercourse both the right to
have it kept at normal levels in a natural condition. Quantity and quality were both
protected by this approach. R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 711-712
(1980).
61. Percolating waters are those which ooze, seep, or filter, through the soil
beneath the surface, without a defined channel, or in a course that is unknown and not discoverable from surface indications without excavation for
that purpose. The fact that they may, in their underground course, at places
come together so as to form veins or rivulets, does not destroy their character as percolating waters.
Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 446, 139 S.E. 308, 311 (1927) (citation omitted); see R. POWELL, supra note 60, at § 724.
62. "To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the
depths." BLACI'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979).
63. See Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H.L. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859); Acton
v. Blundell 12 Mees. & Wels. 324, 354, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (1843); R.
POWELL, supra note 60, at § 725; Clayberg, The Law of Percolating Waters, 14
MICH. L. REv. 119 (1915).
64. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 62, at 1238.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 859

others' property when the same contaminated water migrated be65
neath adjacent lands.

The common law or "English" doctrine of ownership rights in
percolating groundwater, accompanied by strict liability for failure
to contain pollutants, was followed in fact, if not in name, 66 by

many American courts during the late 19th and well into the 20th
centuryG'

Using nuisance terminology, 6 8 these courts continued to

impose liability for pollution of percolating water without focusing
on the presence or absence of fault in the defendant's conduct. 9
65. See Ballard v. Tomlinson, 29 Ch. Div. 115, 24 Am. L. Rep. 634 (1885)
(while there is unlimited right to use percolating water, pollution of such water so to
render it unfit for use when it enters neighbor's land is violation of neighbor's rights
for which action can be maintained). The somewhat anomolous result was that a
landowner, by extracting large quantities of groundwater, could deprive his neighbor
of the resource with impunity. He could not, however, deprive his neighbor of the
resource by contaminating it. This logical inconsistency was not overlooked by some
American courts. See, e.g., Upjohn v. Board of Health, 46 Mich. 542, 549-50, 9 N.W.
845, 848 (1881).
66. The early American cases employ various legal theories, but arrive at
the same results as their English predecessors: The defendant is held liable for contamination of groundwater without proof of intent to pollute or negligence. In
Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868), liability was assertedly based on negligence, but
the court inferred lack of care from the fact that pollutants percolated from defendant's vault into plaintiff's well water. Id. at 584. The "rule" of Fletcher v.
Rylands, L.R. 1 Exch. Ch. 265 (1866) (anything brought on land that has natural
tendency to do mischief if it escapes must be contained at defendant's peril), aff'd,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), underlies the strict liability holding in Berger v. Minneapolis
Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895). Fletcher v. Rylands, as modified by
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), to apply only to non-natural land uses, is
silently invoked in Hauck v. Tide Water Pipeline Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
It is apparent, however, that several of the cases often cited as illustrations of the
strict liability approach actually evidence an erosion of that doctrine. Negligence,
while not identified as such, is brought in through the back door. Defendants are
found liable for failing to foresee that the accumulation of potential pollutants on
land is likely to result in contamination of groundwater. These cases foreshadow the
reasonable use doctrine which gradually evolved as the American rule. See, e.g.,
Gilmore v. Royal Salt Co., 84 Kan. 729, 115 P. 541 (1911); Kinnaird v. Standard Oil
Co., 89 Ky. 468, 12 S.W. 937 (1890); Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 41 Neb. 662, 59
N.W. 925 (1894).
67. See, e.g., Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 93, 22 P.2d 953 (1934);
Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927).
68. Groundwater contamination gave rise to an action in nuisance (trespass on
the case) because a trespass action required the injury to result from an immediate
and forceful invasion by tangible matter, whereas nuisance encompassed consequential harm by any manner of invasion. See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Byars, 228 Ala.
372, 153 So. 616 (1934) (trespass possibly not suitable cause of action for groundwater pollution); text accompanying notes 90-95 infra.
69. The term "fault" is at best an imprecise one. It has been defined as "a
departure from the conduct required of a man by society for the protection of
others ......
W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 4, at 18 (footnote omitted). The authors
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Since water pollution was most often caused by business enterprises, the net effect of this policy was to protect agrarian landowners at the expense of their commercial or industrial neighbors. It
is, therefore, hardly surprising that the jurisdictions taking this approach were those whose major economic interest at the time was
agricultural. 70 Because commercial and industrial concerns were
equated with "non-natural" land uses, the "rule" articulated by
Lord Cairns in Rylands v. Fletcher7l frequently provided the rationale for strict liability.
The social policy underlying this line of early American decisions is exemplified in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion
in Hauck v. Tide Water Pipeline Co. 72 The contamination of
plaintiff's land by oil that escaped through a leak in defendant's underground pipeline and percolated through the soil was declared a
nuisance without discussion of any behavioral grounds for liability.
The court first quoted the trial judge:
If the mere fact that the business is a lawful business, and has
been conducted with care, would be a defense where a neighbor's land has been injured in consequence of the business
carried on there,-the escape of gas, for instance, or the escape
of oil,-the result would be that a man might lose his farm,
might be compelled to leave it, and have no compensation, simply because the business which brought about this loss was a
lawful business, and was carried on carefully. That is not the
use it here to mean any unreasonable or antisocial behavior. As such, it encompasses
not only intentionally inflicted harm and negligence, but also those types of activities characterized as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous. Although the latter are
often subject to strict liability in that negligence need not be alleged or proved, liability is in fact imposed because the activities are considered essentially unreasonable, as they carry with them an abnormal risk of harm to others. See note 219 infra
and accompanying text. This is not strict liability regardless of the nature of defendant's conduct, a concept which permeates many of the older pollution cases, but
strict liability due to the nature of the defendant's conduct. The result is the same in
either case, but is based on different social policies.
70. Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 420-21, 173 A. 627, 631 (1934):
A query arises as to whether the divergence of views [strict liability as opposed to negligence] expressed in these cases is not due to the influence of
the predominating economic interests of the jurisdictions to which these apply; in other words, whether these opinions do not rest on public policy
rather than legal theory....
It will be observed that in jurisdictions holding that, even though there
is no negligence, there is liability for the pollution of subterranean waters,
the predominating economic interest is agricultural.
71. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); see note 227 infra.
72. 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 859

law. No man's property can be taken, directly or indirectly,
without compensation, under the law of this state; hence these
are cases-and a great many of them-where a defendant is held
liable in damages, although his business is lawful, and he has
exercised care in carrying it on. 7 3
The court then continued:
In the consideration of this class of cases, care must be taken to
distinguish between the natural and necessary development of
the land itself and injuries resulting from the character of some
business, not incident and necessary to the development of the
land. .

.

.The owner of the land has the right to develop it by

digging for coal, iron, gas, oil, or other minerals; and if, in the
progress of this development, an injury occurs to the owner of
adjoining land, without fault or negligence on his part, an action
for such injury cannot be maintained. If this were not so, a man
might be utterly deprived of the use of his property. It is not so
where the injury is caused by the prosecution of a business
which has no necessary relation to the land itself, and is not es74
sential to its development.
New York was one of several states to reject this approach to
liability for groundwater pollution. In Dillon v. Acme Oil Co.,75 it
was held that a legitimate business is not liable for contamination
of groundwater in the absence of negligence or knowledge that
such contamination is likely to result from its activities. 76 Unwilling
to view industrial land uses as non-natural so as to fall within the
purview of Rylands,7 7 the Dillon court laid the foundation for the
"American" rule. Unlike its English counterpart, the American rule
73. Id. at 375, 26 A. at 645.
74. Id. at 375-76, 26 A. at 645-46.
75. 49 Hun. 565, 2 N.Y.S. 289 (Sup. Ct., 5th Dep't 1888).
76. Id. at 569-71, 2 N.Y.S. at 291-92. If the result in Dillon appears strange to the

modern reader (defendant not negligent despite knowingly permitting oil to saturate
his property), it is because the Dillon court differentiated between pollutants carried
in percolating water moving laterally along the surface of the soil or immediately be-

low the surface and pollutants which percolate vertically deep into the earth and
eventually enter defined subterranean currents. The former type of migration was
considered foreseeable in that the percolating water was "diffusing itself according
to natural laws .... Id. at 570,2 N.Y.S. at 291. Presumably, one could be negligent with

regard to groundwater contamination arising in this fashion. However, the latter type
of migration was deemed unforeseeable, as the presence or direction of bidden un-

derground watercourses could not be anticipated, and one could not be negligent
with regard to this unforeseeable risk. A situation of this second type was at issue in
Dillon.
77. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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did not give agrarian landowners absolute rights to pure groundwater. The rule recognized that both agrarian landowners and industrial landowners have the right to make reasonable use of their
property. When agrarian landowners are endowed with invariable
rights to pure groundwater, the use to which78industrial landowners
may put their property is severely restricted.
Implicit in the American rule is an acknowledgment of the
conflict existing between industrial and agricultural or residential
land uses, and a resolution of that conflict in favor of industry. The
use of land for industrial purposes almost invariably involves
storing and handling potential pollutants, and results in producing
waste materials which may, even if initially disposed of on land,
find their way into surface water, groundwater, or the atmosphere.
Under the American rule, nonnegligent (reasonable) industrial
users could, by accidently polluting groundwater, completely destroy domestic or agricultural uses without incurring liability. The
states initially adopting the rule were those owing their economic
growth to the coming of industrialization. As such, they were reluctant to discourage capital investment by making industrial landowners financially responsible for consequences they did not intend
and could not foresee. 79 Dillon's progeny multiplied in response to
changing social values and economic conditions to become the
common law approach currently used in a majority of states.80
Thus, groundwater pollution resulting from a reasonable use of
land-that is, from a lawful activity conducted in an appropriate
setting without negligence, intent to pollute, or knowledge that
78. There is a danger that the "American" rule be viewed as a complete abrogation of plaintiff's rights to uncontaminated groundwater, when in actuality it is the
substitution of a flexible standard (reasonable use) for fixing liability for an absolute
one. It is not a question of right denied/right affirmed. See Comment, Liability of
Landownerfor Pollution of PercolatingWaters, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 119 (1955).
79. See Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 421, 173 A. 627, 631-32
(1934):

Defendant's refinery is located at the head of... a natural waterway for
commerce. This plant is situated in the heart of a region highly developed
industrially.... It is an unavoidable incident of the growth of population
and its segregation in restricted areas that individual rights recognized in a
sparsely settled state have to be surrendered for the benefit of the community as it develops and expands. If, in the process of refining petroleum, injury is occasioned to those in the vicinity, not through negligence or lack of
skill ... we think that public policy justifies a determination that such harm
is damnum absque injuria.
80. See, e.g., Trillingham v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 109 F. Supp. 924 (D. Alaska
1953); Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 (1936);
Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954).
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pollution is likely to occur-is damnum absque injuria.81 The
sole exception is injury stemming from a unusually hazardous
activity.82
Characterizingthe Cause of Action
Historically, property-related injuries have been discussed in
terms of nuisance and trespass-terms which classify an injury according to the legal right invaded. These doctrines have become
less meaningful; most contemporary analysis focuses more on the
culpability of the conduct which caused the injury than on the classification of the injury itself. However, because some states still attach importance to these definitions, and the terms permeate case
law and legal commentary in the field of industrial pollution, a
discussion of these doctrines is necessary. Where an industrial defendant expels wastes into the environment, characterizing its conduct as producing a trespass or a nuisance may be significant. Once
it is established that an "intentional" trespass has occurred, the defendant is liable. On the other hand, liability for an intentionally
created nuisance is imposed only where the resulting harm is adjudged unreasonable in light of the circumstances. Moreover, in jurisdictions continuing to determine the statute of limitations by the
legal right invaded, the distinction between trespass and nuisance
can be crucial.
Trespass.-A trespass is an invasion of one's right to the exclusive possession of property. At early common law, absolute liability
was imposed for every unauthorized entry upon another's property,
even if accidental.8 3 Absolute liability for trespass is no longer the
rule.8 4 The vast majority of jurisdictions8 5 adhere to the position
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and impose liability
only where the invasion is intentional, attributable to the defendant's negligence, or the result of the miscarriage of an unusually
dangerous activity. 86 However, since negligence and abnormally
81. "Loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense; that is, without such
breach of duty as is redressible by an action." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note
62, at 354.
82. See text accompanying notes 219-231 infra.
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 13, at 63.
84. Id. at 64.
85. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1967); Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 289 A.2d 68 (1972);
Christ v. Civil Air Patrol, 53 Misc. 2d 289, 278 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1967); Loe v. Lenhardt,
227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 164-166 (1976).
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dangerous activity are independent bases of liability equally appli-

cable to other categories of harm, trespass has come to denote intentional entry only. 8 7 In the context of a trespass, the term intent
does not necessarily refer to motive. Defendants, in committing an
intentional trespass, need not have sought deliberately to damage
their neighbor. Liability attaches where a defendant acted purposefully to enter the land or, in setting some object in motion, almost
88
certainly knew that it would come to rest in that location.

In the Love Canal case, contaminants buried by Hooker and
emanating from land owned by the Board of Education invaded ad-

jacent homes. However, plaintiffs would be hard pressed to show
that either Hooker or the Board had the requisite intent to establish an intentional trespass, since neither intended the contaminants' migration. In fact, it is difficult to imagine any inactive,

hazardous waste disposal site situation, short of one in which wastes
have been dumped directly on another's property, where the right

to recovery could be predicated successfully on this doctrine. 89
Perhaps in the rare instances where wastes have been accumulated
in a place from which the defendant "knew" that contaminants

87. See Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954). The jurisdictions vary in their linguistic treatment of the basis for liability in trespass. Some
courts hold that trespass is an intentional tort and that invasion due to negligence
and abnormally dangerous activities involve separate theories of recovery. Others define trespass to encompass the three traditional categories of tortious conduct. This
disparity is more a matter of semantics than substance, but makes trespass cases difficult to read on a comparative basis.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162, Comments b-c, at 100-10 (1976);
see Hawke v. Maus, 141 Ind. App. 126, 131, 226 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1967); Cover v.
Phillips Pipe Line Co., 454 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Mo. 1970).
89. This is the typical "midnight dumper" situation. As the phrase suggests, the
injured party is most often left "in the dark" as to the identity of the potential defendant, thereby rendering moot the subject of intent. Some typical problems (although in unusual combination) are illustrated by Woburn, Massachusetts, a community a few miles north of Boston. Radioactive wastes were discovered buried in the
town dump; arsenic and lead compounds lined an area frequented by joggers and
picnickers; chloroform was found in the city's water supply system; two chromiumfilled "settling lagoons" are the legacy of a defunct chemical company; drums containing hazardous chemicals were found in a marshy area near the intersection of
Route 128 and Interstate 93; and two wells-part of the city's water supply
system-were contaminated with tri-chloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene. It is
perhaps not coincidental that Woburn appears to have the highest cancer rate of any
community in Massachusetts with a population exceeding 20,000. N.Y. Times, May
16, 1980, § 1, at 16, col. 2. With the exception of the defunct chemical company (whose
viability as a defendant is minimal), the sources of the town's chemical ills are unknown, and probably unknowable. Hazardous wastes will frequently defy being
traced to an identifiable source. In this respect the Love Canal may be the unusual
situation.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 859

would be washed by rain or surface water or be blown by wind
onto neighboring property, a case imposing liability for intentional
trespass might be made.
Even in the rare situation where the required intent is present, trespass may prove an unwieldy doctrine for plaintiffs living in
states still steeped in common law tradition. A few jurisdictions
continue to recognize the historic distinction between trespass and
trespass on the case (comparable to nuisance), despite its abandonment by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.90 The former is a direct and immediate invasion of another's interest in exclusive possession of land, the latter an indirect, consequential invasion. 9 ' In
these states, the distinction can have a profound effect on the issue
of liability because it often determines the applicable statute of
limitations-which is usually longer for trespass. For example,
Alabama has a six-year statute of limitations for trespass, while actions on the case are time-barred after one year.92
Intertwined with the distinction between direct and indirect
application of force is the common law differentiation between invasion by solid or liquid matter and invasion by fumes, gases,
smoke, or vibrations. Several courts adhere to the traditional
theory that direct interference with exclusive possession of land can
be made only by an object capable of occupying measurable
space. 9 3 They hold that the entry of microscopic matter gives rise
to an action in trespass on the case. The absurdity of this distinction was highlighted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Martin v.

Reynolds Metals Co. :94
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had
not yet peered into the molecular and atomic world of small
particles, the courts could not fit an invasion through unseen instrumentalities into the requirement that a trespass can result
only from a direct invasion. But in this atomic age even the
uneducated know the great and awful force contained in the
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158, Comment i, at 278-79 (1965); see,
e.g., Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954), aff'd,
236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957); City of Fairhope v.
Raddcliffe, 48 Ala. App. 224, 263 So. 2d 682 (1972).
91. W. PROSSER,supra note 59, § 13, at 65. See generally Scheafer, Recovery in
Trespassfor Injury to Land Caused by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054 (1980).
92. ALA. CODE §§ 6-2-34,-39 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash.
1954), affd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957); Coalite
Inc. v. Aldridge, 285 Ala. 137, 229 So. 2d 539 (1969); Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg,
232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
94. 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960).
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atom and what it can do to a man's property if it is released.
[T]he now famous equation E=mc2 has taught us that mass and
energy are equivalents and that our concept of "things" must be
reframed....
[When looking] to the character of the instrumentality . . .
we prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force rather than
its size. Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest . . .
whether the intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter
or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical
language of the physicist. 95
Despite the logic of the Oregon opinion, the classification of defendant's act, in jurisdictions true to the letter of the common law,
continues to turn in part on the size of the invading instrumentality. Thus, when intentional conduct is involved, a claim for damages wrought by a stone may be subject to a different, usually
longer, statute of limitations than a claim for damages wrought by
microscopic particles, noxious fumes, or toxic gases. 96 This archaic
limitation in the law of trespass could have unfortunate ramifications for victims of hazardous waste disposal sites, where as at the
Love Canal, the invasion will most often be by substances invisible
to the naked eye.
Nuisance.-Nuisance describes a particular category of harm
-an interference, other than a trespass, with the use and enjoyment of land. 9 7 Such interference need not result in liability; the
concept of reasonableness is at the core of nuisance doctrine. 9 8 The
law recognizes that nearly all human activity results in some inconvenience to others. Since every use of land affects the use or enjoyment of surrounding property, people must be permitted,
within reasonable limits, to inflict minor annoyances on their

95. Id. at 93-94, 342 P.2d at 793-94 (emphasis omitted).
96. See WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. §§ 4.16.080, 4.16.130 (1962) (three year statute
of limitations for trespass, two year statute of limitations for actions on case).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). This describes a private
nuisance. A public nuisance is an interference with a right common to the community at large, such as an interference with public health, safety, or convenience. Id. §
821B. As Prosser points out, there is little similarity between the two, aside from the
fact that each results in inconvenience to someone. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 86,
at 573. Although the doctrine of public nuisance may represent an effective theory of
recovery for federal and state governmental entities seeking remuneration for
clean-up and containment costs at hazardous waste disposal sites, a discussion of
public nuisance as applied to environmental pollution is beyond the scope of this Article.
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 87, at 580-81.
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neighbors while pursuing their own interests. 99 Consequently, liability is imposed for a condition or activity alleged to create a nuisance only where the interference is significant and the defendant's
conduct has been unreasonable. 100

Many older cases imposed liability under the nuisance label
without discussing the tortious nature of the defendant's acts.' 0 1

They appear to suggest that a plaintiff can recover merely by establishing a substantial invasion of his or her rights. In fact, however,
such cases almost invariably arose in situations in which the de-

fendant's intentional conduct was designated a nuisance by statute;
where the defendant intentionally engaged in an activity that was

clearly out of place in its surroundings; or where the defendant's
2
10
activity was extraordinarily hazardous, as in the case of blasting.

Modem case law explicitly affirms that nuisance liability must be
predicated upon a showing that the defendant intentionally, negli-

gently, or in the course of an unusually risk-laden undertaking, impaired the ability of neighboring landowners to enjoy their property.. 0 3 Except for the ultrahazardous situation, there is no
financial responsibility for purely accidental interference.

The contamination of homes and the adverse human health
consequences caused by wastes migrating from a landfill clearly
constitute a substantial intrusion.' 04 To attach the nuisance label is,
however, to say little with regard to a generator, disposer, or siteowner's liability. At inactive sites, intentional behavior will rarely
be at issue. Although the waste generator or disposer created the

landfill intentionally, the harm to surrounding property owners is
99. An amusing example of the legal system's recognition of this truism can be
found in the opinion of Justice Daniel E. Fitzpatrick in Louisiana Leasing Co. v.
Sokolow, 48 Misc.2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1966), a case dealing with the right of a
"downstairs" apartment house tenant to be free from disturbances caused by his "upstairs" neighbor.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 812F, Comment c, at 105 (1979); W.
PROSSER, supra note 59, § 87, at 577-81.
101. See W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 87, at 573-74, 582-83, and cases cited
therein.
102. Id. at 582-83.
103. The following cases typify the modem nuisance analysis: Nelson v. C & C
Plywood Corp., 134 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314 (1970); Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 143
Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724 (1944); Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126
A.2d 403 (1956).
104. Where the harm involves more than mere discomfort or an assault on the
senses, but affects the physical condition of the plaintiff's property or results in injury to his or her person, the substantial nature of the interference is apparent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, Comment d, at 105-06 (1979); W. PROSSER,
supra note 59, § 87, at 578.
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produced by movement of contaminants beyond the confines of the
site, an unintended occurrence. While intentional nuisance is often
an effective theory of recovery where an ongoing concern knowingly emits pollutants into the atmosphere or releases them into
water, 10 5 it is unlikely to prove useful in the land-burial context. In
most instances, the defendant will not have "created or continued
the condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the
10 6
harm to the plaintiff's interests is substantially certain to follow."
In the inactive, hazardous waste disposal site situation, liability will
require proof that toxic substances contaminated plaintiffs' property
as a result of the defendant's lack of care (negligence), or that the
land burial of hazardous wastes is an inherently dangerous activity
warranting the application of strict liability.
The harm which the contents of an inactive site inflict on surrounding residents results from an activity occurring many years
before the actual injury manifests itself. In some cases, a site that
becomes a nuisance continues to be owned by the waste generator
or by a municipal or private disposal agency or firm. In others, title may have been transferred to a party unconnected with waste
generation or disposal, as at the Love Canal. The new owner may
have acquired the property with notice of its former use, or may
be totally ignorant of its capacity for harm. The law is clear that
landowners who have tortiously created or maintained an artificial
condition on their land, which becomes a nuisance to surrounding
residents, cannot escape liability by conveying the offending property. 10 7 It is equally clear that landowners who have not contributed to the harm by their own tortious conduct are not liable for
injury caused by a dangerous, artificial condition created or maintained by their predecessors until they know or should know that it
exists, and have had reasonable opportunity to abate the danger. 0 8s Particularly in the area of environmental abuse, the courts
105. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953);
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312

(1970); Atlas Chem. Indus. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
106. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 87, at 574 (footnotes omitted).
107. See O'Connor v. Altus, 123 N.J. Super. 379, 303 A.2d 329 (1973); Cavanaugh
v. Pappas, 91 N.J. Super. 597, 222 A.2d 34 (1966); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d
39, 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975); State v. Ole Olsen, Ltd., 65 Misc. 2d 366, 317 N.Y.S.2d
538 (1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 967, 331 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821F, Comment d, at 105-06 (1979).
108. See Bellflower v. Pennise, 548 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1977); Abbot v. Braswell,
289 Ala. 90, 265 So. 2d 871 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 366, 839
(1979).
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have recognized that "reasonable opportunity to abate" does not
extend to enormous clean-up costs for another's pollution.' 0 9 As
the Superior Court of New Jersey noted:
[M]ere ownership of property without anything more cannot and
should not be the determinative factor in imposing liability....

In this industrial age ownership has no more relationship to the
problems of pollution than did the theory of privity of contract to
the problems of products liability. As the privity of contract

theory prevented just results and enabled the party responsible
for defects in products to escape liability, so would blind adherence to a theory making every landowner liable for pollution on
his land regardless of the source of that pollution. 110

Thus, while the doctrine of nuisance appears applicable to
harms resulting from inactive, hazardous waste disposal sites, so labeling plaintiff's cause of action will not determine defendant's liability. The important inquiry will focus on the nature of the conduct which caused or contributed to the harm. Except in the rare
instance where intentional behavior is involved, nuisance doctrine
will be impotent as a mechanism for gaining compensation unless
negligence or a proper case for strict liability can be established.
Negligence.-Negligence has been defined as conduct "which
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk of harm.""' The standard requires
the actor to have done what the careful, prudent individual supposedly would have done in the same situation."12 In many areas of
human endeavor, the community's expectations for this mythical
individual are clear-either because they have been articulated in
statutes, or because there is a general consensus based on a long
history of shared experience. Few would question, for example,
that reasonable behavior before crossing a busy thoroughfare includes stopping and looking." 3 Proof of negligence in this commonplace situation is a single-faceted endeavor: proof of the standard's
109. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339
(1977); New Jersey v. Ventron Corp., Nos. C-2996-75, C-1110-78 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div., Bergen County Aug. 27, 1979).
110. New Jersey v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 485, 376 A.2d 1339,
1349-50 (1977).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 282, at 9 (1965).
112. W. PROSSEP, supra note 59, § 32, at 150.
113. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Standard Oil Co.
v. Noakes, 59 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1932).
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violation. Sufficient evidence must be produced to satisfy the factfinder that the actor did not stop and look.
Negligence in the inactive, hazardous waste disposal site context will be far more difficult to define and establish. Because the
setting in which the activity took place is often remote in time, and
the materials involved are relatively unfamiliar to laypersons, what
constitutes unreasonable conduct is not so immediately clear. Prodf
of negligence becomes double-faceted. It requires more than
producing evidence concerning what the defendant did or did not
do years earlier-in itself a difficult task. It also requires first establishing a standard of reasonable care against which the specific con114
duct alleged may be measured.
The commonly accepted formula for determining reasonable
care in a given situation involves three variables: (1) The probability that an accident will occur; (2) the gravity of the injury which
will be suffered if an accident does occur; and (3) the cost, financial
or in terms of inconvenience, of precautions to prevent the accident."15 If the cost of preventing plaintiff's injury would have been
less than the cost of the injury, discounted by the probability of its
occurrence, the defendant's failure to prevent the injury is deemed
unreasonable, that is, negligent. 1 16 Thus phrased, the formula presupposes that the defendant had perfect foresight as to the consequences of his or her conduct. Since few defendants are clairvoyant, the degree of foresight actually possessed becomes a major
issue in the negligence action, along with the cost and feasibility of
accident avoidance.
Thus, negligence is a conclusion of law requiring a factintensive analysis. As such, there is a limit to the utility of discussing it in the abstract. The Love Canal situation, however, can
be used to illustrate some of the proof problems facing plaintiffs in
other hazardous waste disposal litigation. In discussing negligence
at the Love Canal, we do not presume to prejudge the conclusions
which will be reached by the trier of fact. We do not have at our

114. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 37, at 205-08.

115. This is the Learned Hand formula articulated in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). For a discussion of Hand's formula in
general economic terms, see Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
32-33 (1972).
116. For another view of cost allocation, see Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a

Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) (reverse learned Hand
formula is discussed as test for strict liability).
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disposal all the evidence from which a case in negligence might be
made or defeated. We merely seek to demonstrate that a broad
range of complex factual issues will have to be explored and resolved, and that an attempt to prove negligence will be time
consuming, expensive, and difficult.
a. Proving Negligence at The Love Canal.-ForHooker 17 to
be found negligent, plaintiffs must: (1) Establish that, at the time of
burial, the chemical company was able to foresee that the wastes
might pose a future threat of injury to residents of property surrounding the site and (2) establish that, despite having knowledge
of the potential hazard or access to such knowledge, the company
failed to take reasonable precautions, either in its choice of disposal
alternatives, in siting the landfill, in its disposal practices, or in its
subsequent conveyance of the Canal.
There is a danger in assessing with the benefit of hindsight
acts occurring in the past: "Nothing is so easy as to be wise after
the event."118 Although the public is now aware of the hazards
posed by the land disposal of chemical substances," i 9 an evaluation
of the reasonableness of Hooker's conduct in 1942-52 (or the past
conduct of any generator-disposer of hazardous wastes) must be
made in the context of the time in which it occurred.' 20 Such an
evaluation must recognize, however, that a chemical company may
be charged with the highest degree of knowledge of both the dangers posed by land disposal and the injurious potential of its
wastes, which was available at that time.'21
117. Defendants in the lawsuits arising out of the Love Canal tragedy include
the Niagara Falls Board of Education, the City of Niagara Falls and Niagara County,
as well as Hooker and its parent Occidental Petroleum Corp. See United States v.
Hooker Chems. and Plastics Corp., No. 79-990, at 40 (W.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 20, 1979);
Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct., Niagara
County 1979); New York v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 41006 (Sup. Ct., Niagara
County, Apr. 28, 1980). An analysis of the differing legal positions of each of these
defendants is beyond the scope of this Article and is not pertinent to the development of our thesis. The defendants will vary in every hazardous waste disposal situation. Public entities will not always be involved. Therefore, we are focusing on
Hooker, the generator and landfill owner, because a discussion of its position has
broader application to other fact situations.
118. Cornman v. Eastern Countries R. Co., 4 H.&N. 781, 786, 157 Eng. Rep.
1050, 1052 (1859) (Bramwell, B.).
119. See notes 278-282 infra and accompanying text.
120. "The culpability of the actor's conduct must be judged in the light of the
possibilities apparent to him at the time, and not by looking backward 'with the wisdom born of the event.'" W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 31, at 146 (footnote omitted);
see Ismert-Hincke Milling Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 238 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1956);
Gerber v. McCall, 175 Kan. 433, 264 P.2d 490 (1953).
121. See Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d
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Hooker may claim that during the 1940's neither Hooker nor

chemical manufacturers in general fully understood the dangerous
character of substances with which they were dealing, especially in

terms of their long-term persistence and the quantities and extent
of contact necessary to inflict harm.. 2 2 Plaintiffs' efforts to prove
the contrary will require searching the technical literature of the

day and considerable reliance on expert testimony. 123 If it becomes
apparent that Hooker did not fully appreciate the dangerous quali-

ties of the wastes, plaintiffs may argue, in an analogy to the extensive testing which must precede the marketing of new drugs, that
the company was obligated to further inform itself before
introducing the substances into the environment. 1 24 Such an analogy, however, presupposes the existence and availability of ade-

quate testing equipment and techniques, another issue requiring
expert testimony for resolution. 12 5 Further, the value of the anal401 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289, Comment m, at 45-57 (1965);
W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 161-62. Moren v. Samuel H. Langston Co., 95 Ill.
App. 2d 133, 145, 237 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1968).
122. Hooker does, in fact, claim such ignorance. See Love Canal Hearings, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Bruce Davis, President, Industrial Chemicals Group,
Hooker Chemical Co.).
123. The task, while difficult, should not be insurmountable. See H. ELKINS,
THE CHEMISTRY OF INDUSTRIAL TOXICOLOGY (1950); L. FAIRHALL, INDUSTRIAL
TOXICOLOGY (1949); Y. HENDERSON & H. HAGGARD, Noxious CASES AND THE
PRINCIPLES OF RESPIRATION INFLUENCING THEIR ACTION (2d ed. 1943); N. SAX,
HANDBOOK OF DANGEROUS MATERIALS (1951). The latter volume cites a list of 63

references upon which it is based and, as currently revised, is still considered a primary source in this area. Its author has written with respect to the 1951 edition,
that none of the material in my book or my references was in anyway confidential or difficult to obtain. Anyone who wanted it could dig it out as I did
from reference books, journals and even publications by the chemical manufacturers who tried to be very accurate on physical and chemical data, but
somewhat less so when they discussed toxicity.
Letter from N. Irving Sax to William R. Ginsberg (Mar. 19, 1980) (copy on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
124. The actor may
be engaged in an activity, or stand in a relation to others, which imposes
upon him an obligation to investigate and find out, so that he becomes liable
not so much for being ignorant as for remaining ignorant; and this obligation
may require him to know at least enough to conduct an intelligent inquiry as
to what he does not know.
W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 160 (footnote omitted); see Hopkins v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952).
125. Primary methods now available for the identification of chemical substances are mass spectrometry and gas chromotography. The first commercial mass
spectrometer was used in 1942 at the Atlantic Refining Corporation for petroleum
analysis. The instrument did not achieve general use as an analytic tool until the
1960's. Since then, its usage has become standard in analytical laboratories. M.
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ogy decreases proportionately with the degree of care taken to insure that the substances would remain confined to the disposal

site. Clearly, there is a significant difference between failing to test
the human reaction to drugs which the manufacturer knows will be
ingested, and failing to test the human reaction to waste products

which the disposer intends to isolate from the public.
During the years 1942-1952, land burial of waste materials was
an accepted practice throughout the chemical industry.1 26 High
temperature incineration technology, capable of destroying most
organic materials, was still in its developmental stages and even
now is not widely available in the United States. 12 7 The only prac-

tical alternative to land burial was disposal into a body of water. In
retrospect, even the Love Canal may appear more desirable than
dumping directly into the Niagara River (which supplies drinking

water to the cities of Buffalo and Niagara Falls) or permitting the
wastes to be borne away by the municipal sewage system. Thus, it

appears unlikely that the company's decision to bury the wastes, as
opposed to using another disposal method, can in itself be deemed

unreasonable.
Further, a strong argument can be made that during the
1940's the Love Canal was an almost ideal site for a landfill. An aerial photograph taken in 1938 shows that the property immediately
surrounding the site was undeveloped with the exception of a

single dwelling, and that the neighboring area was sparsely popuGROSS, MASS SPECTROMETRY 444 (1978). The potential of gas chromatography was

not demonstrated until 1952, and the gas chromatograph did not achieve common
use until the 1960's. C. LOCHMUELLER, GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY 678 (1978). The

two instruments are now often used in tandem. Components separated by a gas chromatograph can be analyzed by a mass spectrometer. The process is referred to as
"GCMS." Id.
126. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-75.
127. By burning certain waste materials at sufficiently high temperatures for a
sufficient period of time to destroy them completely or render them inert, incineration technology can dramatically reduce both the volume and toxicity of industrial
wastes. Such technology is currently being used in Europe and in a few parts of the
United States. However, despite this successful experience, there are no commercial
high temperature incinerators available in New York. STATE OF NEw YORK, DEP'T
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT ON: INACTIVE
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL SITES AND THE REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK

FORCE ON HAZARDOUS WASTES 46-47 (1979). It is ironic that today the Hooker
Chemical operation in Niagara Falls owns two private incineration facilities, and essentially all of the company's organic liquid chemical wastes are incinerated. Love
Canal Hearings, supra note 5, at 7 (written statement of Bruce Davis, President, Industrial Chemicals Group, Hooker Co.).
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lated. 128 The Canal excavation itself was dug in a stratum of relatively impermeable clay, which even by today's standards represents a formidable barrier to migration. 129 In short, it will be
difficult to establish that Hooker failed to exercise care and judgment in selecting the Love Canal as a disposal site, particuarly in
view of the rather primitive approach to waste disposal which has
been prevalant in the United States.130
Efforts to establish negligence in the disposal methods used at
the Canal may be hampered by a lack of records and reliable
witnesses. A Hooker spokesman has indicated that documentation
does not exist to show the type and quantities of chemicals deposited in the Canal or the dumping procedures used. 131 Testimony
from employees who participated in the landfilling or have firsthand knowledge of what occurred is likely to be unavailable or un128. Photograph No. 2359, Division of Laboratories and Research, N.Y. State
Dep't of Health; see note 40 supra.
129. Among the recommendations made in the report by Calspan Corp. is investigation as to the possible use of clay barriers to prevent lateral migration of contaminated water out of the Canal. Calspan Report, supra note 37, at 27. "The clay
barrier would be placed such that it goes through the more permeable upper six feet
of soil into the heavy impermeable lower clay layer." Id. This suggests that the clay
stratum into which the Canal is dug continues to act as an effective barrier to the
movement of contaminants, and use of a clay barrier in the upper stratum is required
to contain the overflow. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra. The regulations issued under RCRA also recommend the use of natural clay barriers in secure

landfills. See 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,989 (1978).
130. A litany of hazardous waste disposal tragedies is incanted in SUBCOMM.

ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, supra note 48, at 2, 4, 9-13. At the "Valley of the Drums" in

Shepardsville, Kentucky, 17,000 barrels of hazardQus waste were simply left on the
surface in the hauler's backyard. Id. at 10. In Elizabeth, New Jersey, 40,000 barrels
of toxic substances were stacked in twenty foot piles within a few feet of a local road
and railroad track. Id. In Lathrop, California, thousands of gallons of pesticide waste
were discharged directly into extremely permeable soil. Id. at 11. At Hooker's S-area
site in Niagara Falls, New York, chemicals were deposited into porous trenches located only a few hundred feet from a principal source of drinking water. Id. at 9-10.
Finally, toxic wastes were spread on Texas roads as an ingredient of road oil. Id. at
12-13. In short, the Subcommittee concluded that "proper disposal of hazardous materials is the exception, rather than the rule." Id. at 2.
131. See Love Canal Hearings, supra note 5, at 71-72, 89-90 (statement of
Bruce Davis, President, Industrial Chemicals Group, Hooker Chemical Co.). Davis
testified that information and estimated figures were developed for the Interagency
Task Force on Hazardous Wastes by reviewing past sales and production records and
interviewing workers because few records were kept of chemicals deposited in the
landfill. Id. Poor or nonexistent documentation appears to have been standard practice, as other waste generators interviewed by the Task Force also relied on oral histories from present and past employees to quantify and even locate waste disposal
areas. Id. at 92.
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certain due to the passage of time. Two on-site studies undertaken
for the City of Niagara Falls in 1977 and 1978132 and the study
conducted by the Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes 33
have clarified some of the factual uncertainties bearing on the negligence question. For example, it was ascertained that quantities of
liquid chemical waste were deposited in the site in metal drums
which corroded. 134 Since it is not unreasonable to posit that even
in 1942-1952 it was generally known that such deterioration would
take place, an issue is raised as to whether more permanent containers were then available at realistic cost. The studies also revealed that some of the liquids were poured directly into the excavation without benefit of containers. 135 The reasonableness
of such conduct-largely a function of the state of Hooker's knowledge as to the toxicity and longevity of the wastes and the
hydrogeological nature of the site, is yet another issue. A third issue raised by these on-site studies concerns the location of the
wastes within the excavation. There are indications that the Canal
was filled above the level of the clay stratum, increasing the exposure of the wastes to infiltration by rain and surface water, and setting the stage for their migration.136
However, despite these studies and other investigations conducted at the Canal, at least one key factual question remains
unanswered: What was the nature of the cover which Hooker
placed over the excavation before transferring the property? 137 Was
there a clay "cap" properly constructed and contoured to deflect
water away from the Canal?
Since Hooker appears to be in a superior position to have information regarding disposal practices and the existence of a cap,
plaintiffs may attempt to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur' 38
to ease the difficulties of proof. This doctrine is generally confined

132.

Conestoga-Rovers & Assocs., supra note 38; Calspan Report, supra note

133.

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21.

37.

134. Calspan Report, supra note 37, at 2. The report also indicates that solid
wastes were deposited in the Canal in cardboard containers. Id. at 9.
135. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 11-75. "Bulk quantities of liquid

and solid industrial wastes were deposited directly into the Canal." Id.
136.

See note 37 supra and accompanying text.

137. See note 38 supra; note 148 infra.
138. "The thing speaks for itself." The doctrine was created almost inadvertantly
in the English case of Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H.&C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). See
W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 39, at 213.
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to factual settings in which the defendant has maintained exclusive
control over the harmful instrumentality, and where the resulting
injury does not ordinarily occur unless those in control fail to exercise reasonable care. 139 At waste disposal sites there are numerous
factors other than lack of due care that may cause buried materials
to reach the human environment. 140 Since today many believe that
even the most modern, carefully designed and constructed "secure" landfills cannot adequately protect against these factors,' 41
some courts might find res ipsa loquitur particularly inappropriate
in a case involving a landfill constructed and operated at a less
technologically advanced time. 142 If the doctrine is used, its procedural effect will vary considerably from court to court. 143 Were
Love Canal plaintiffs to present the identical case in several different jurisdictions, this lack of procedural uniformity could result in
disparate outcomes.
Several issues bearing on the negligence question arise with
respect to the transfer of the site to the Board of Education. Possibly, the entire Love Canal tragedy might have been averted had
Hooker retained possession. By alienating the property, the company cut off its ability to monitor the long-term security of the Canal. Since Hooker knew the nature of the materials in the landfill,
information unavailable to others, it might appear that alienation
was in itself unreasonable. This could depend, however, on the ex139. Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403 P.2d 507 (Okla. 1965); Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491 P.2d 1037 (1972); W.
PROSSER, supra note 59, § 39, at 214-15.
140. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
141.

Id.

142. Prosser points out that in the formative years of aviation, airplane accidents were so frequent due to rudimentary technology that negligence could not be
inferred from an unexplained plane crash or disappearance. As safety improved
through technological advancement, the application of res ipsa loquitur to many
types of airplane mishaps became justified. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 39, at 216.
An analogous situation exists with regard to inactive disposal sites. Although injury occurs in the present, in itself a time when it is difficult to infer negligence, the activity subject to a negligence analysis may have taken place at a time when technology
and scientific knowledge was sufficiently rudimentary that as a matter of common experience, lack of appropriate care cannot be inferred. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 782, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 135 (1967) (court found res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable where property damage to adjoining lands was caused by
seismic vibrations from test firing of huge rocket motor, as experience at time of decision with effects of rockets of that size was too limited to apply standard of reasonable care drawn from past experience). Possibly the same might be said of land burial of chemical wastes in the 1940's and 50's.
143. N. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 40, at 228-31.
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tent to which the recipient of Hooker's largess was informed of the
possibility of the wastes' migration and the need for vigilance. Accordingly, plaintiffs will likely wish to evaluate the nature of any
warnings or assurances given by Hooker to the grantee. The exchange of information between the two was not limited to the deed
language. 1
The contents of these communications also bear on the question of negligence as it pertains to the Board of Education. While
Hooker may be presumed to have had more than ordinary knowledge of the dangers of chemical wastes and the insufficiencies of
landfills, 145 the Board cannot be charged with a similar degree of
expertise. 146 Love Canal victims may argue that the ominous tone
of the deed language was itself sufficient to put the Board on notice
of the unsuitability of a chemical disposal site for a school, or at
least should have alerted the Board to the need for further inquiry.' 4 7 If plaintiffs can produce evidence of more explicit warnings than that contained in the deed, the use to which the Board
put the property and its failure to monitor the site might be made
to appear clearly unreasonable.
144. Bruce Davis, President, Industrial Chemicals Group, Hooker Chemical
Co., testified that there was extensive correspondence between Hooker and the
Niagara Falls Board of Education which put the Board on notice of the dangerous
nature of the chemicals contained in the Canal. Love Canal Hearings, supra note 5,
at 60-61, 84. A Hooker representative testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations that the Board of Education was warned against construction
activity of any kind on the Canal site and that Hooker transferred the property only
at the insistence of the Board. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 48, at 18. A
public relations pamphlet published by Hooker in June, 1980 claims that despite repeated warnings by the company, the Board was so anxious to acquire the Canal that
it threatened condemnation proceedings in the face of Hooker's reluctance to sell.
HOOKER CHEMICAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T, LOVE CANAL: THE FACTS

(1892-1980)

(Hooker FACTLINE No. 11, June 1980).
However, serious doubt is cast upon the sincerity of Hooker's warnings and alleged reluctance to sell the property by the company's attitude concerning the subsequent disposition of another disposal site in the Niagara Falls area. Two internal
company memos recommend that the 102nd Street dump, containing toxic wastes, be
sold to the City for park and recreational facilities or be sold to a private residential
developer. SuBCoMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra, at 19.
145. "Professional men in general, and those who undertake any work calling
for special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do,
but also to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability." W.
PROSSER, supra note 59, § 32, at 161 (footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 289, Comment m at 45-46 (1965).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 32, at 157-60.
147. See note 36 and accompanying text.
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Complex issues of proximate and intervening cause may also

have to be resolved in the course of litigation. Most of the Love
Canal homeowners moved to the neighborhood well after dumping
had terminated and the property had been conveyed. The question
arises as to whether their arrival was forseeable. Plaintiffs might argue that Hooker and the Board of Education can be charged with
knowledge that the school would be a major factor in attracting residents to the area. Under such a view, homeowners cease to be
"unforeseeable victims," and become a class which Hooker and the
Board were bound to protect from exposure to harmful substances.
In addition, the possibility remains that the waste materials might
have remained confined to the Canal had not the construction of
the LaSalle Expressway, the school, and neighboring homes disturbed the ground. 148 Whether these excavations were sufficiently
unforeseeable to absolve Hooker of responsibility is, thus, an additional inquiry.
b. Waste Disposal Sites in General.-In some respects, the
Love Canal may be the easy case. The proof problems inherent in
a negligence cause of action against Hooker Chemical or the Board
of Education have been considerably mitigated by factual findings
already made by the public and private studies undertaken, which
were prompted in part by the publicity surrounding the Love Canal tragedy. At other inactive, hazardous waste disposal sites, the
same keen public and state and federal government interest may
be lacking. Plaintiffs at such sites may not have the benefits, practical or financial, of intensive, government-sponsored investigation.
Since the nature and quantity of the waste materials and the actual
disposal practices have rarely been recorded by generators, haulers, or site owners, 149 plaintiffs may have to initiate and bear the
cost of private on-site "digging expeditions," which, depending on
148. Hooker contends that up to 17,000 cubic yards of soil were removed from
the Canal site between 1953 and 1955 by the Board of Education in connection with
the construction of the elementary school. The company also claims that in 1957 and
1960 the City of Niagara Falls penetrated the clay covering and walls of the Canal
excavation while installing storm sewers across the site in connection with construction of two local roadways. The integrity of the Canal was breached again in 1968,
this time by the State, when soil and wastes were removed during construction of
the LaSalle Expressway. According to Hooker, these events occurred despite well
publicized warnings that excavation was undesirable and possibly dangerous.
HOOKER CHEMICAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T, supra note 144.

149. See note 131 supra. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at HI-3, stresses
that much of its data on the contents of disposal sites is not derived from specific
company records, but from rough estimates of past activities and personal recollections.
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the site's age and the attending circumstances, may or may not
prove a fruitful source of information. They may also have to
arrange and pay for water and air samples to be taken from proper150
ties surrounding the site and analyzed at qualified laboratories.
Interviews with employees, past and present, of the many different
business enterprises that could be involved in the creation and
maintenance of the disposal site may have to be conducted.1,51 As
representatives of potential or actual defendants, these personnel
may be reluctant to cooperate with the plaintiffs. In short, without
significant factfinding assistance from the public sector, the cost of
developing the information necessary to pursue a cause of action in
negligence may be prohibitive, and the length of time involved
may intensify existing hardship and injuries.
The Love Canal may also be the easy case because there is at
least one clearly identifiable defendant. During the critical years
that the Canal was in use, the site was owned and controlled by
Hooker, the acknowledged waste generator. Transporting toxic
substances between Hooker's manufacturing operations and the Canal was done either by Hooker or by independent carriers acting
under its direction. Consequently, decades later, it is possible not
only to attribute the bulk of the materials present in the site to a
specific source, it is possible to charge that source with knowledge
of the chemical composition of the waste and its destination, with
knowledge of the on-site disposal practices, and with knowledge of
the overall maintenance of the site, at least until its transfer to the
Board.
At other hazardous waste disposal sites, identifying the appropriate defendant or defendants may prove far more difficult due to
uncertainty surrounding the past relationships and interactions of
multiple participants. Typically, there are three separate groups of
participants involved in the creation of a hazardous waste disposal
site: The generators, the haulers, and a succession of site owners. 152 A single site may contain a variety of substances generated
150. Health and environmental testing at the Love Canal will cost New York
taxpayers approximately $2,725,000. Love Canal Hearings,supra note 5, at 5 (written

statement of Michael J. Cuddy, Coordinator of the Governor's Love Canal Task
Force). While it is not suggested that costs will necessarily be as high at other hazardous waste disposal sites, this figure conveys some idea of the magnitude of the financial burden. Additionally, there appears to be a nationwide scarcity of private
laboratories equipped to perform the required analysis. See id. at 151-53 (oral testimony of Michael J. Cuddy).
151. See notes 152-154 infra and accompanying text.
152. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, is broken down into these three cate-

gories.
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by several different enterprises. 153 Some of these substances may
be harmful, others not. In many instances, generators will have retained private haulers to remove and dispose of industrial wastes.
These haulers may have been uninformed as to the nature of the
materials, just as the generators may have been unaware of the
wastes' ultimate destination. Site owners, having dealt only with
haulers, may have known neither the source nor the contents of
the materials being deposited. To further complicate the situation,
haulers typically work for several different generators and may use
any number of disposal sites. 1 54 Conversely, generators often retain
the services of more than one private carrier. It is apparent that
many years later, even with some participants identified, it may be
impossible for plaintiffs to isolate a culpable party in the waste disposal chain. While numerous cases 155 have been decided in the last
156
forty years which have used theories such as concert of action,

153. For example, eighteen different corporate entities deposited industrial
wastes at Seaway Industrial Park in the Town of Tonawanda, New York. Some of
these companies disposed of as many as eight separate categories of waste materials,
each of which may have contained several toxic ingredients. See id. at 11-89 to -90.
154. A single hauler in Buffalo, New York serviced twenty-seven waste generators and disposed of twenty-eight categories of wastes at eight different disposal
sites. Id. at IV-20. The dimensions of the problem can be gleaned from a reading of
the Task Force Report in its entirety. Id.
155. See generally Note, DES and A Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability,

46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 978-95 (1978) and cases cited therein. In many respects
the DES cases pose difficulties which are similar to those posed by injuries resulting
from hazardous waste disposal sites. Because of the time lapse between ingestion of
DES and manifestation of cancer and the additional interval before the causal connection is recognized, plaintiffs cannot identify the manufacturer of the drug taken
by their mothers. Id. at 972. For additional cases dealing with DES, see Eclavea,
ProductsLiability: Diethylstilbestrol(DES), 2 A.L.R.4th 1091 (1980).
156. The typical concert of action case is that of the illegal drag race in which a
bystander is injured by one of multiple participants. Although the bystander is injured by a single car, he may sue any one or all of the participants, each of whom is
jointly and severally liable. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939); 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 698-99 (1956). See generally Boykin v.

Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961). Participants in concerted wrongdoing
are "[a]Il those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious
act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or
encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts for their benefit .... "
AV. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 47, at 292 (footnotes omitted). The rationale underlying this theory appears to be deterrence of dangerous group activity, and only a few
cases have applied it to circumvent the plaintiff's identification problems as to the
cause-in-fact of injury. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). While concert does not require evidence of an explicit
agreement, but only of a tacit understanding manifest through parallel behavior, it is
questionable whether plaintiffs in hazardous waste disposal site litigation could establish cooperation between the diverse enterprises involved at a disposal site to ig-
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alternative liability, 157 and res ipsa loquitur' 5 8 to ease the plight of
nore the then existing safety standards in favor of more risk laden, though less
costly, practices. Courts which have inferred concert from similar behavior patterns
have had at least minimal evidence of a common effort before them. See Roberto
Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, M.B.H., 31 F. Supp. 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 116 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. Roberto Hernandez, Inc.,
313 U.S. 582 (1941); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Jones, 245 Ark. 179, 431 S.W.2d 728
(1968).

157. This theory has been applied in cases where all possible tortfeasors have
been joined as defendants and have been proved negligent, but the one who caused
plaintiff's injury cannot be identified. The burden of proof as to cause-in-fact shifts
to the defendants. Each must absolve himself or be held jointly and severally liable.
See Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hall v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,
199 P.2d 1 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3), at 441-42 (1965). The
policy underlying this approach is that all defendants were wrongdoers whose conduct created a situation which rendered the plaintiff unable to identify the cause of
his or her injury. Rather than let the innocent victim go remediless, the tortfeasors
should be required to apportion the damages among themselves, or be liable for the
entirety. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3), Comment f at 446 (1965). The
usefulness of alternative liability in the inactive hazardous waste disposal site context is questionable. Most courts have refused to apply it where less than all the possible tortfeasors are before the court or where not all have been proved negligent.
See, e.g., Shunk v. Bosworth, 334 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1964); Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62
F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973); Eley v. Curzon, 121 Cal. App.2d 280, 263 P.2d 86 (1953).
In many cases it will be impossible for victims of hazardous waste disposal to identify all those who participated in the creation and maintainance of a site, just as it
will be impossible to prove that the conduct of each participant was negligent. Although the Restatement acknowledges that eventually the theory may be modified to
accommodate situations where all involved parties cannot be joined as defendants,
this has not yet taken place. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 443B(3), Comment

h, at 446 (1965).
158. Some courts have used res ipsa loquitur where there are multiple defendants, but only one unidentifiable defendant can be assumed to have caused
plaintiff's injury. In such cases, the burden of proof as to negligence and causation is
shifted, and all defendants who cannot absolve themselves are held jointly liable.
This use of res ipsa loquitur has generally been confined to situations where every
possible tortfeasor is before the court; the circumstances surrounding the injury
make it impossible for the plaintiff to identify the harmful conduct and its perpetrator; and the defendants have access to the pertinent facts. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 39, at 221-25; McCoid, Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7
STAN. L. REv. 480 (1955); Note, Res Ipsa Loquitor in Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 106 (1969). This approach has been most frequently used in
medical cases involving operating room injuries, where all defendants owed the
plaintiff a special duty of care. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d
687 (1944); Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929
(1975). Prosser notes that with the exception of cases where some special duty is involved or where the defendants are so closely connected as to be considered a single
enterprise, "res ipsa loquitur still has not been held to apply against multiple defendants, where it is inferable only that one has been negligent." W. PROSSER, Supra, at 224 (footnote omitted).
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plaintiffs unable to identify the party responsible for their injury,
none has arisen from so complex a factual setting.
Strict Liability.-The common law has responded over time
to fundamental social, demographic, and economic change. 159 In
some instances, injuries arising from new circumstances have been
accommodated by adapting preexisting doctrine. 160 However,
when such accommodation has proved inadequate, the courts have
demonstrated a willingness to abandon existing legal principles,
6
and construct substitutes better suited to current needs.1 1
The 19th century transition from strict liability to negligence
was a reflection of popular enthusiasm for industrial developEven in situations where each defendant owed plaintiff a special duty of care,
the application of res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants has been attacked for imposing liability without fault. See, e.g., Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves' Latter-Day Saints
Hosp., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968); Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1043 (1962); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur:
Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REV. 643 (1950).

159. See Note, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial
State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 401, 423-24 (1974). See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1946); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881); Patterson, The Appor-

tionment of Business Risks through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335 (1924);
White, From Sociological Jurisprudencein Realism: Jurisprudence& Social Change
in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999 (1972).
160. A historical tracing of the doctrine of implied warranty illustrates how
seemingly narrow legal constructs have been expanded by the courts to provide relief for previously uncontemplated plaintiffs. Implied warranty of merchantability
was first raised in 1815 and ran from the producer to the middleman dealer, not the
ultimate consumer. See Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (N.P. 1815); K.
LLENWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES 340 (1930). An injured consumer
could not invoke this guarantee of quality because there was no privity of contract
between the consumer and the parties to the warranty. See Winterbottem v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The English Sales of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., c.71, §
14 (1894), enabled the ultimate purchaser to utilize implied warranties from his
seller, but only as to goods which were purchased without opportunity for inspection
or as to defects which could not be ascertained by visual inspection. Id. § 14(2).
After implied warranties were made available to consumers, additional protection
was needed to circumvent the restrictions of privity of contract, which limited recovery to the immediate purchaser seeking relief from his retail seller. Courts began to
manipulate the privity concept in order to reach manufacturers and wholesalers who
were further up the distribution chain. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.,
261 F. 878 (2d Cir. 1919); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916). For discussions of the gradual demise of privity, see Bohlen, Liability
of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 LAW Q. REV.
343 (1929); Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 153-55
(1958). The necessity for privity of contract was finally abandoned in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
161. See notes 165-174 infra and accompanying text.
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ment.16 2 The negligence standard shifted many of the social costs
of industrialization from entrepreneurs to those harmed by their
endeavors, thereby providing an environment in which private en-

terprise could flourish. The misfortunes of those property owners,
consumers, or members of the labor force injured by the inevitable
accidents accompanying the industrial era were subordinated to the

"public interest"-as represented by material productivity.16 3 By
the turn of the 20th century, however, societal attitudes concern-

ing the welfare of private individuals began to change, and the
benefits of relatively unfettered industrial expansion began to be
questioned. With "big business" occupying an increasingly domi-

nant economic and social position by virtue of its superior bargaining power in the marketplace and the workplace, the need to
impose social responsibility commensurate with this role began to
6
be recognized.1

4

The judicial effort to make industry more responsive to the
public welfare has manifested itself in a marked expansion of strict

liability in the law of torts. Over the last two decades, common law
instances of liability without proof of fault have increased numeric162. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 924 (1967). See generally
Rabin, Some Thoughts on Tort Law from a SociopoliticalPerspective, 1969 Wisc. L.
Rv. 51; Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q. REV.
184 (1926).
163. [The courts] were anxious to see that the tort system of accident compensation did not add to the problems of new industry. Few people imagined that accidents would become so numerous as to create severe economic
and social dislocations. On the contrary, rash extension of certain principles
of tort law to industrial accidents might upset social progress by imposing
extreme costs on business in its economic infancy.
Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 50, 58 (1967). For additional discussions of the social policies underlying the negligence standard, see Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 368 (1951); Peck, Negligence and Liability Without
Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 225, 229-31 (1971).
164. The Consumers' League, formed in 1891, and the National Consumer
League, formed in 1898, were instrumental in convincing Congress to enact legislation protecting the public from harmful products. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL GOALS
RESEARCH STAFF, TOWARD BALANCED GROWTH: QUANTITY WITH QUALITY

135-36

(1970). Public concern for safety manifested itself in the Food and Drug Act of 1906,
ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-379a (1976)), and the Meat
Inspection Act of 1907, ch. 9313, 34 Stat. 669 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§
601-695 (1976)). For a history of the development of public attitudes toward the
safety of food products, see Regier, The Strugglefor Federal Food and Drug Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1933). As industrial accidents increased in number and severity during the late 19th Century, the plight of those suffering work related injuries was eased by the creation of employer liability under the workmen's
compensation system. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 163, at 60.
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ally and have broadened in scope. 16 5 Absent an act of God, carriers

are now absolutely liable for damage to cargo. 16 6 Manufacturers
and sellers of defective products are held financially responsible to
consumers for harm caused by those products. 16 7 In a dramatic departure from the traditional doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate
dealings, developers are beginning to be held strictly liable for de-

fects in housing. 168 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers have long been responsible for the work-related misdeeds
of their employees. 169 Today, employer liability, through theories
of non-delegable or expanded duty, may encompass independent
contractors as well. 170 Harms caused by unusually risk-laden un165. Peck, supra note 163, at 232; Comment, Return to Anonymous: The Dying
Concept of Fault, 25 EMORY L.J. 163, 164 (1976).
166. The common law rule has long been that the "liability of a common carrier is that of an insurer against all risk of incident to transportation, save such as resuit from the act of God or public enemy .. " Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d
358, 373, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52 (1971). This is also the rule in New York. See Kuehne
& Nagel v. Baiden, 36 N.Y.2d 539, 330 N.E.2d 624, 369 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1975);
Rodriguez v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 32 N.Y.2d 425, 299 N.E.2d 243, 345 N.Y.S.2d
993 (1973). Federal law is in accord with the state common law rule. See Missouri
P.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1963); S.S. Ansaido San Giorgio I v.
Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U.S. 494 (1934); Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296

(1934).
167. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d
818 (1979).
168. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Kreigler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
169. See Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972); Lundberg v. State, 25
N.Y.2d 467, 255 N.E.2d 177, 306 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1969). For discussions concerning the
theory behind vicarious liability, see Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for
Principal'sLiability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REV. 260 (1951); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
170. See Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1980). The
nondelegable-duty doctrine makes the employer liable for the misconduct of an independent contractor whenever dangerous activities are involved. Id. The employer
will be responsible for any injury resulting from the independent contractor's failure
to exercise reasonable care, even though the employer provides for special precautions in the contract with the independent contractor. The employer is vicariously liable regardless of his or her own due care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 416, 427 (1976). This is the rule in California. Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68
Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968). It is also the rule in New York.
Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1973); McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 20 N.Y.2d 160, 228 N.E.2d 899, 281 N.Y.S.2d
1002 (1967). The reasons most often given for this vicarious liability is that the employer, who selects the independent contractor, can carefully choose one that is financially solvent and can demand indemnity from him or her in the event of finan-
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dertakings are compensable under strict liability for ultrahazardous
or abnormally dangerous activity. 17 ' The shift from contributory
negligence to comparative negligence has altered the fault concept,
removing it as a bar to recovery. 172 Res ipsa loquitur, technically a
procedural device, has frequently been expanded to become a nom
de plume for strict liability.' 73 Movement toward joint liability of
multiple defendants, where the identity of the individual causing
the harm cannot be ascertained, is yet another example of the
growing resolve that the cost of injuries born of a highly technological age be lifted from the shoulders of innocent victims, and
be placed on those possessing the tools and knowledge to devise
174
safer products and technology.
Moreover, legislative efforts to ensure a more socially responsible business sector have steadily increased since the turn of the
century.' 75 In the 1970's, statutory schemes aimed at reducing the
cial loss. Furthermore, the employer can purchase liability insurance and then

distribute the risks to the general public by setting higher prices for the goods or
services. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 69, at 459.
171. See Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal.
1976) (transportation of explosives); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal.
App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) (test firing of large rocket motor); City of
Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976) (storage of oil);
Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961) (aerial crop spraying).
172. Adoption of comparative negligence has occurred in some states through
judicial fiat. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Nga Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). For a discussion of the Nga Li case, see Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239
(1976); Comment, Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence-The Supreme
Court of California Takes a Historic Stand, 51 IND. L.J. 281 (1976). Other states
have adopted comparative negligence by legislative enactment. New York, for example, abandoned contributory negligence in 1975, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1411
(McKinney 1976), after some prodding from the New York Court of Appeals. See
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 344-45, 298 N.E.2d 622, 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
471-72 (1973). For an overview of comparative negligence, see Peck, Comparative
Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REv. 689 (1960);
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1953). Comparative fault has
also found its way into products liability cases. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). For a discussion of
comparative negligence in products liability, see Twerski, The Use and Abuse of
Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REv. 797 (1977).
173. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Anderson v.
Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975); Norman v. Greenland Drilling Co., 403
P.2d 507 (Okla. 1965).
174. See Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hall v. E.I.
DuPont deNemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See generally McCoid, supra, note 158.
175. Such legislation, though somewhat erratic, has taken many forms and in-
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adverse environmental impact of industry finally came into their
own, as major environmental acts were passed. 176 Although these
acts seek to regulate the behavior of manufacturers, they do not
provide for compensation to those injured by environmental abuse.
Environmental statutory schemes give little recognition to the
behavior-modiying aspect of common law damages. 177 Such damfluenced many fields. See, e.g., Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74, (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976)); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)); Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (current version at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)); Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82
Stat. 146, §§ 101-114 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (1976)); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 2, 84 Stat. 91 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-4374 (1976)); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No.
92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2501 (1976) (amended 1978)); Noise
Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4901-4918 (1976)).
176. In a very short period of time, the following statutes were passed: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) (amended 1977, 1978)); the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 (1976) (amended 1977)); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976)
(amended 1978)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)
(amended 1977)); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516 § 2(b), 86 Stat. 973 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§
13 6-1 3 6y (1976) (amended 1978)); the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No.
94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976)); and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907, 6911-6916, 6921-6931, 6941-6949,
6951-6954, 6961-6964, 6971-6979, 6981-6986 (1976) (amended 1978)).
177. The provisions of six of the major federal environmental statutes are reviewed in Costle, Introduction, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 661 (1978). None of the six provides for the compensation of hazardous waste victims. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-2 (1976), as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §
7401 (Supp. II 1978) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976), provide for suits by private citizens. However, a
private citizen may sue only for enforcement of regulatory provisions. Skillem, Private Environmental Litigation: Some Problems and Pitfalls, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 675,
685 (1978). Under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6973 (1976), the EPA may initiate court
action to force clean up of an abandoned site which poses imminent health hazards.
While RCRA preserves a private individual's right to seek relief under existing statutory schemes or common law, it does not provide for a compensatory action. Id., §
6972 (1976). The legislative history indicates that the proponents of the bill were primarily concerned with prevention of future harm, rather than compensation for past
injuries, and ignored the relationship between the two. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6238,
6240-41.
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ages, awarded with regularity, provide an economic incentive to
discover the harmful potential of substances and ways of minimiz-

ing the risk of injury before the substances are introduced into the
178
marketplace or the environment.
Since strict liability is the common law's, and perhaps society's, most effective means for insuring recovery, its application

should be extended to harms arising from industrial pollution.1 79

The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976), regulates the
manufacture and distribution of potentially harmful chemicals. This act empowers
the EPA to require testing and special handling, but does not provide injured individuals with a compensatory right of action. Id., §§ 2603, 2605. In 1978, amendments
to The Toxic Substances Control Act were proposed which would have provided
compensation to those harmed by hazardous chemicals. H.R. 9616, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978); S.1531, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1978). The bills were never enacted. None
of the following regulatory schemes provide for private compensation suits: Clean
Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. I) (amending Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976)); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300f-j(10) (1976) (amended 1977, 1978); The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976).
178. Situations such as Love Canal illustrate that regulation alone is inadequate
because it may produce change only after substantial injury has occurred. An excellent example is N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0903 (McKinney Supp. 1980) enacted in 1978 by the New York State Legislature as an amendment to the Industrial
Hazardous Waste Management Act, N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0301, 27-0900,
27-1101, (McKinney Supp. 1980) and to the N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1281, 1285c,
1285d (McKinney 1970) (amended 1974, 1978, 1979). Pursuant to § 27-0903, the term
"hazardous waste" is to be defined according to a list of harmful substances promulgated by the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation. Only substances contained in the Commissioner's list are subject to the provisions of the statute. One can
assume that the list will require ongoing expansion as scientific research and incidents like the Love Canal disclose new or previously unlisted toxic substances. In
short, the list, and consequently the substances subject to regulation, will continually
lag behind the realities of the situation. For a discussion of the dangers implicit in
relying exclusively upon regulation to influence conduct in the hazardous waste context, see Toxic Substances Control Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 9616 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348-58 (1978) (statement of
Frederick R. Anderson, President, Environmental Law Institute).
Although courts usually focus on the compensatory nature of damages, another
equally important reason for imposing liability on a defendant is to provide an incentive to avoid future harm.
179. Several commentators have discussed strict liability as a means of
deterring pollution while compensating pollution victims. See, e.g., Esposito, Air and
Water Pollution: What to Do while Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 32, 38-39 (1970); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technological Assessment, 38 U. CiN. L. REv. 587, 616-17 (1969); Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A NonAccidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666-83 (1971). See
generally Deane, Industrial Toxicology: A New Frontierfor Products Liability, 1
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This is particularly necessary in light of the causation problems inherent in such cases. The following discussion explores the extent
to which existing theories of strict liability might be applied to
plaintiffs whose claims arise from exposure to toxic substances
emanating from hazardous waste disposal sites. The time appears to
be ripe for a new dose of judicial creativity, similar to that exercised in the field of products liability.
a. Products Liability Analogy.-At first glance, the liability
imposed on the manufacturer or distributor of a defective product
to compensate an injured consumer appears different from the
liability which might be imposed upon the generator or disposer of
hazardous wastes to compensate those injured by environmental
pollution. This is essentially because the latter situation lacks the
responsibility-creating nexus of a commercial transaction. The two
situations, however, are not as disparate as they might seem. In
both, an industry, motivated by profit, has created a harm-causing
agent. In one, that agent is a product; in the other, a byproduct.
Both are inextricably related consequences of the same industrial
processes. Although the byproduct does not reach the public via
the marketplace, it nevertheless enters the human environment
when it is burned, dumped in a body of water, or buried. If one
views the commercial transaction requirement of products liability' 80 as merely one means of "getting the ball into play," in a
manner giving the public participant little control over the outcome of the game, it is apparent that so far as responsibility is concerned, it should matter little whether the harm-producing agent
was sold to its recipient or arrived as an unsolicited gratuity.
Strict products liability was promulgated to further two basic
goals: (1) To reduce the often catastrophic impact of accident costs
by shifting them from the victim to the party better able to spread
them, through liability insurance or increased prices, over a broad
segment of society and (2) to discourage manufacturing and marketing commodities dangerous to the public, and, conversely, to encourage the development of higher safety standards by placing the
TRIAL LAW. Q., Winter 1975, at 36; Sizemore, The Chemical Conspiracy: New PVerspectives in Products Liability, TRIAL, Nov. 1976, at 28.
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1976) imposes strict liability
on one "who sells any product in a defective condition ..
." Id. (emphasis added).
"[B]y marketing his product for use and consumption, [the seller] has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it ....
Id., Comment c at 349-50.
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cost of accidents on those who monitor and control the production

and distribution processes.' 8 ' Toward these ends, strict liability
makes compensation more certain when product-related accidents
do occur, by removing the necessity of establishing a specific act of
negligence by a business enterprise whose workings are incompre82
hensible to the average consumer.1
With these goals in mind, the justifications for invoking strict
liability in the hazardous waste disposal situation are even more
persuasive than in the consumer products area. While the complexity of modern materials and design makes it difficult for consumers to evaluate intelligently the safety of their purchases, the
ultimate decision concerning what to buy and from whom remains
their's. True, there is unequal bargaining power between buyers
and sellers, particularly where a product varies little from producer
to producer or is in limited supply. True, there is often gross inequality in the state of knowledge and the opportunity for meaningful inspection, forcing purchasers to rely upon the expertise, reputation, and representations of manufacturers. Yet, ultimately,
buyers of defective products had a choice and presumably made
that choice after careful consideration. Most important, they might
have made the decision not to buy at all. This element of choice,
albeit diluted by consumer ignorance and seductive marketing
techniques, permits consumers some modicum of control over their
fate.
Innocent victims at inactive, hazardous waste disposal sites
have no choice: Neither the opportunity to select the types of
contaminants to which they will be exposed nor the opportunity to
decline them altogether. The "goods" are thrust upon these
unsuspecting "consumers" without their consent. We do not refer
to those who knowingly purchase homes in close proximity to acknowledged hazardous waste dumps. Their situation raises issues
181. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring):

Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business.
For other statements of the policies underlying strict products liability, see Lechuga,
Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32,37-38,467 P.2d 256,260 (1970) (Jacobson, J., concurring); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963) (en bane).
182. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
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akin to coming to the nuisance1 8 3 and assumption of the risk. 184
Whether their damages are compensable depends on the exigencies of their individual situations. We refer to people, like those at

the Love Canal, whose title searches and visual surveys did not reveal the information necessary to make a knowledgeable decision, 185 people who believed they were moving into an area con-

taining a harmless household garbage dump, or those whose water
supplies were contaminated by wastes deposited many miles away.
The position of these victims is similar to that of the innocent bystander who is injured by a defective product. The California Court
of Appeals, in extending strict products liability to such bystanders,
pointed out that the policy justifications for invoking the doctrine
are particularly persuasive where the victim has not voluntarily
sought out the source of injury by becoming a party to the transaction which placed the product in the stream of commerce. 186

If liability is to be imposed on the generators or disposers of
hazardous wastes as flowing from the same "enterprise" which created the product, there is abundant rationalization for such a re183. The term "coming to the nuisance" refers to the situation where a person
purchases or acquires land next to an already existing nuisance. Some courts hold
that a plaintiff mar, .ot recover because he or she has voluntarily chosen to live next
to the nuisance. See, e.g., McClung v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d
371 (1951); East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Or. 505, 246 P.2d 554
(1952). However, most courts have held that coming to the nuisance is merely one
factor that the court will consider when determining what constitutes reasonable use
of property. See, e.g., Hall v. Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S.W.2d 33 (1943); Graceland
Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries, 7 A.D.2d 89, 180 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1st Dep't 1958),
affd, 6 N.Y.2d 900, 160 N.E.2d 926, 190 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1959); Hartung v. County of
Milwaukee, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 86 N.W.2d 475 (1958). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 59, § 91, at 611.
184. "Assumption of the risk" is defined by the Restatement as "voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger...." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n, at 356 (1977); see Colosimo v. May Dep't
Store Co., 466 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (3d Cir. 1972) (experienced swimmer diving into
2V2 feet of water constitutes assumption of risk); Denton v. Bachtold Bros., 8 Ill. App.
3d 1038, 1040, 291 N.E.2d 229, 231 (1972) (awareness of danger and failure to use
safety features of power mower held assumption of risk).
185. See note 41 supra.
186. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969):
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the
consumer or user where injury to bystanders . . . is reasonably foreseeable.
Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects
and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, where as the bystander ordinarily has
no such opportunities.
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suit.' 8 7 Students of the interaction of law and economics have long

viewed strict products liability as but an example of a general market approach to resolving the problem of escalating accident costs
in a complex industrial society.18 8 They advocate a tort system
within which the cost of all harms associated with a business activity are absorbed by that activity-to be ultimately reflected in the
price of its product or service. Their argument, grossly oversimplified, is that where the costs of all injuries generated by a forprofit undertaking are passed to the consumer, an informed
marketplace selection will likely occur.18 9 In many cases, consumer
preference will require those enterprises generating the greatest
injury costs to settle on a safer, but still economically sound, modus operandi, or be forced out of business by less harmful competitors able to offer lower prices. 190 The argument, while worthy of
judicial recognition, has not yet received it in significant measure.
Those cases that speak of enterprise liability use the term to denote the vertical liability rapidly emerging in the products
arena. 191 Despite predictions by its creator' 92 that strict products
liability will eventually be carried over to other areas of accident
law, 193 and despite the fact that its conceptual basis applies with
187. Generators and disposers are best able to assess the risks, take preventative measures, and distribute the costs of those accidents that do occur. See Calabresi
& Hirschoff, supra note 116, at 1060-67; Gregory, supra note 163, at 382-83, 386;
Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153, 158-61,
184-94 (1976); Morris, supra note 169, at 1176-79.
188. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 13-14 (1970); Klemme,
supra note 187, at 187-88.
189. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 188, at 68-75; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 502-08 (1961).
190. See Calabresi, supra note 189, at 519-24.
191. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d
168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 711, 723-26, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323-24 (1972); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 275-76, 408 A.2d 818, 825-26 (1979). Vertical liability increases the number of potential defendants in the strict products liability suit by
including as proper parties all those who participate in the chain of distribution.
192. Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court is regarded as the father
of strict products liability. See James, A Tribute to the Imaginative Creativity of
Roger Traynor, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 445 (1974). Judge Traynor's concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), advocated
the frank adoption of strict tort liability for the manufacturer of an exploding beverage bottle, in place of the needlessly circuitous res ipsa loquitur on which the court
relied. Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
193. Judge Traynor viewed strict products liability as the bare beginnings of an
effort to cope with the accident problem created by mass industrialization. See
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 375-76 (1965).
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equal, if not greater, force to harms arising out of industrial pollution of the environment, 194 it is doubtful that the doctrine will be
widely extended by analogy to the hazardous waste disposal site
situation in the near future. In general, the courts have been reluctant to stray from the seller-consumer construct created in Escola

v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.1 95 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Product, Inc. ,196 and incorporated into Section 402A of the 1965 Re-

statement (Second) of Torts.197 Some have been flexible enough to
ignore the Restatement's sales requirement, and apply products liability to leasing, 198 licensing, 199 and bailment200 arrangements, and
to hybrid service-sale transactions that are basically commercial in
nature. 201 Others have been unwilling to deviate even this far from
194. See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of
Hazardous Wastes, 64 MiNN. L. REv. 949, 983-85 (1980). There the author applies
each of the policies set forth by Judge Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.

to the hazardous waste situation and concludes that each policy is furthered by extending strict liability in this context.
195. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
196. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
198. E.g., McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 487, 79
Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965).
199. E.g., Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (defective washing machine in laundromat).
200. The bailment situation has occurred in the context of the lending of tools
from one subcontractor to another.
In such a situation the lending party may be held liable to an employee of
the borrowing party [for injury] arising from a patent defect in the tools or
equipment lent if the lender was compensated for the bailment, or if the
bailment was mutually advantageous to the lender and the borrower.
Kennedy v. United States Constr. Co., 545 F.2d 81, 84 (8th Cir. 1976). Other bailment cases include Reid v. Volkswagen of America, 512 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975);
Holmes Packaging Mach. Corp. v. Bingham, 252 Cal. App. 2d 862, 60 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1967).
201. E.g., Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (defective water
heater installed by building contractor); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697 (1969) (defective permanent wave solution applied by beautician).
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the language of the Restatement, although the same need for public
protection and cost spreading exists in these transactions as in outright sales. 202 The cases do reveal a degree of judicial tinkering
with the ordinary meaning of "consumer product."2 0 3 An increasing
number of courts, more concerned with the social policies underlying products liability than its technical form, have expanded the
definition to encompass the sale of new housing. 204 However,
movement toward strict liability for builders of defective homes is
by no means universal. 20 5 Isolated excursions beyond the pale of
the Restatement can, of course, be found. In 1969, for example,
the California Court of Appeals held that the "manufacturer" of an
improperly filled and graded building lot could be held strictly liable in tort for subsurface defects in the "product." 20 6 However, as
20 7
a rule, the courts have been wary of carrying analogies too far.
202. See, e.g., Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D.
Pa. 1967), aff'd, 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968) (owners of fire-damaged property sued
lessor of gasoline pump equipment). "Section 402A is applicable, by its very terms,
to sellers. Since the Restatement provides rules for lessors of chattels at Sections 407
and 408, and makes no mention of lessors in Section 402A, it is apparent that this
section is not intended to be applied to any but sellers." Id. at 868 (emphasis in original).
203. See cases cited in Comment, What Is or Is Not A Product Within The
Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 625 (1974).
204. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
The court stated:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and
the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions which make no
sense in today's society and tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected....
Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325; see Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972).
See generally Maldonado, Builder Beware: Strict Tort Liability for Mass-Produced
Housing, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 283 (1979).
205. See, e.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179 (Colo. App. 1972); Cox
v. Shaffer, 223 Pa. Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456 (1973).
206. Avner v. Longridge Est., 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639
(1969).
207. Appellants' argument that an automobile driver with a long history of epilepsy should be subject to strict tort liability upon losing consciousness and crashing
into innocent bystanders was rejected in Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d
528, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1971).
Drawing a parallel with . . . products liability cases, appellants argue, with
some degree of logic, that only the driver affected by a physical condition
which could suddenly render him unconscious and who is aware of that condition can anticipate the hazards and foresee the dangers involved in his operation of a motor vehicle....
We decline to superimpose the absolute liability of products liability
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Despite highly vocal advocacy by legal commentators, 208 the majority of courts have steadfastly refused to apply the strict products

liability rationale to pure service transactions or to service-sale hybrids involving the learned professions. 20 9 This stand suggests that

the definition of product is not likely to be extended with any regularity to other than objects of a commercial transaction in the near
future.

Should a court occasionally venture outside the narrowly circumscribed parameters of the doctrine in order to accommodate

victims of hazardous waste disposal, it is far from certain that compensation will be appreciably facilitated. Negligence-related concepts, primarily that of foreseeability, continue to permeate strict
products liability case law, 210 despite the Restatement's assurance

that fault is irrelevant in determining liability under Section
402A, 211 and despite protestations from legal commentators212 and
cases upon drivers under the circumstances here. The theory on which those
cases are predicated is that manufacturers, retailers and distributors of products are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public and are
an integral part of the over-all . .. marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries from defective parts.... This policy hardly applies here....
Id. at 532, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42 (citations omitted); see Clark v. Dziabas, 69 Cal. 2d
449, 445 P.2d 517, 71 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1968); Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 445
P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968).
208. See, e.g., Note, supra note 194; Note, supra note 159.
209. See, e.g., Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106
(3d Cir. 1972) (airplane owner sued plane's servicer following crash); La Rossa v.
Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968) (widow of worker exposed to
carcinogenic dust sued designer of plant's operations); Shepard v. Alexian Bros.
Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973) (hepatitis contracted from
blood transfusion administrated in hospital); Hillas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 120
N.J. Super. 105, 293 A.2d 419 (1972) (injured passenger sued elevator maintenance
company); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd 100
N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968) (dentist's hypodermic needle broke in patient's
jaw); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (ill-fitting contact lenses purchased from optometrist).
210. Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability: The
Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 101, 109 (1976):
After years of thinning anemia, one would expect the final demise of
foreseeability in negligence risk analysis. Yet an attenuated residue of the
foreseeability factor continues unabated in the current principle of strict liability for defective products. Foreseeability of risk continues to cling like a
barnacle on strict products liability doctrine.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n, at 356 (1965):
"[T]he liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the
seller, but is strict liability .... "
212. The number of articles devoted to criticism of the "negligence approach"
to strict liability is staggering, making a bibliography impossible. Two outstanding
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some courts 213 that foreseeability is a test for determining due care
where negligence is at issue, having no place in the strict liability
analysis. Foreseeability has been used by courts following the
Cardozian approach articulated in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad21 4 to set the outer limits of duty in products cases, and thus
render a seller liable only to those plaintiffs clearly within the anticipation of the proverbial reasonable man. 215 Such use of the
foreseeability concept, while not explicitly condoned by the Restatement, is nevertheless encouraged by Section 402A's limitation
of recovery to those who can be classified as "consumers" or
"users" of the defective product.2 16 On the other hand, the Restatement speaks of causation, but is silent as to proximate causation.2 17 Yet, many cases interject a proximate cause requirement
into the strict products liability cause of action, and deny recovery
for extraordinary consequences that could not be readily foreseen
2 18
by the supplier.
The use of foreseeability to limit liability ignores the economic
goal of strict products liability, and, if transposed to the inactive,
hazardous waste disposal site situation, would resurrect proof problems discussed previously in connection with negligence. Victims
living distances from the disposal site, those arriving after the
dumping had been discontinued, and those developing symptoms
of disease well after exposure to toxic substances had terminated
may be outside the circle of danger contemplated years earlier by a
generator or disposer. The types of injuries that they incur may be
exotic when viewed from the perspective of an entrepreneur
contributions arePolelle, supra note 210; Note, Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeabilityand Related Negligence Concepts, 14 TULSA L.J. 338 (1978).

213. See, e.g., Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 259, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831
(1972): "[TIhe doctrine of foreseeability, although a recognized doctrine where ordinary negligence in tort is involved, has no part in the concept of strict liability in
tort;" Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
214. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
215. See, e.g., Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974). A young
child's fingers were injured when caught in the exposed belts of a forage wagon. The
child did not recover damages because the court held that a manufacturer is liable
only to those individuals whose injury from a defect in the product can be reasonably foreseen. Presumably, adult farm workers would have been foreseeable victims,
but a four-year-old girl would not. Id. at 11-13, 310 N.E.2d at 3-5.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment o, at 356-57 (1965);
Polelle, supra note 210, at 116-17.
217. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
218. See, e.g., Oehler v. Davis, 223 Pa. Super. 333, 298 A.2d 895 (1972) (dog escaped from allegedly defective collar and injured plaintiffs).
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913

operating at a less scientifically sophisticated time. Consequently,

knowledge as to the toxicity, mobility, longevity and the long-term
effects of the waste materials, as well as the hydrogeological nature
of the disposal site, is likely to be an issue even where fault is no
longer at issue.
b. Ultrahazardous Activity.-Society accepts a broad range

of risks incident to daily living, and individuals are expected to absorb the costs arising from the resulting harms. However, when
the risks surpass normal expectations, liability is imposed upon
their creator. This may arise either because a reasonable activity
was pursued in an unreasonable fashion, that is, negligence, or because the activity itself was unreasonable in terms of the magnitude
of the risk that it posed. In the latter instance, society may recog-

nize that the activity is desirable, but require the-resulting costs to

be borne by those who benefit from the activity most directly.2 19

In order to achieve this objective, strict liability is invoked.
Strict liability for harms arising from unusually dangerous con-

ditions and activities is generally traced to the English decision
Rylands v. Fletcher.2 2 0 Acceptance of the approach was slow in the
United States because strict liability was seen as an impediment to

industrialization. 2 2 1 While the principle has now received general
judicial recognition, 2 22 this has taken place under different rubrics,
each supported by a subtly different analysis. 22 3 A few states con219.

W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 75, at 495.
The courts have tended to lay stress upon the fact that the defendant is
acting for his own purposes, and is seeking a benefit or a profit of his own from
such activities, and that he is in a better position to administer the unusual
risk by passing it on to the public than is the innocent victim. The problem
is dealt with as one of allocating a more or less inevitable loss to be charged
against a complex and dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed upon
the party best able to shoulder it.
Id. For a discussion of the moral and economic underpinnings of ultrahazardous activity, see James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REv.
293 (1958); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401
(1959); Morris, supra note 169.
220. 3 H.&C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Exch. Ch.265 (1866),
aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
221. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 78, at 509; see text accompanying notes 161-

163 supra.
222. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 78, at 509.
223. Texas, for example, applies the Rylands principle in an unusual fashion.
Strict liability is invoked for injuries resulting from water pollution only where the
defendant has intentionally discharged a harmful substance. All unintentional discharges are governed by the negligence standard. See Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v.
Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (1975).
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tinue to base liability for high-risk activities directly on the Rylands
decision. 224 The majority, however, apply the ultrahazardous test
contained in the first Restatement225 though some jurisdictions now
appear to be leaning toward the abnormally dangerous test contained in the Restatement (Second).226
The emphasis in Rylands was on the inappropriate character of
the activity in its surroundings. 227 With adoption of the term
A few courts apply the Rylands rule under the absolute nuisance, nuisance per se, or
trespass labels. See, e.g., Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 438
P.2d 674 (1968); Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517
(1944); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924).
224. E.g., City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49
(1976).
225. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938) provides:
Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity
for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous,
although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
Furthermore, "[a]n activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by
the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage." Id. § 520.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976) provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
The following factors will be considered when determining whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Id. § 520.
227. The rule of the case is often said to be: "[T]he person who for his own

purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Exch. Ch. 265, 279-80 (1866). However, this "rule" was announced in the intermediate Exchequer Chamber and was subsequently limited by
the final decision rendered in the House of Lords which stated that the principle applied only to "non-natural" uses of land. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338
(1868). Thus, the emphasis was shifted to the abnormal and inappropriate character
of the defendant's activity in its locale, rather than its inherently dangerous character.
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"ultrahazardous" by the Restatement, the emphasis shifted to the
inherently dangerous nature of the activity itself, accompanied by
the proviso that it be one not pursued by the general popula-

tion. 228 When the semantics changed to "abnormally dangerous" in
the Restatement (Second), an evaluation of the activity's relationship to its surroundings was reinstituted. 22 9 What appears to have
emerged are two doctrines within a doctrine. Although each requires a high risk of substantial injury to justify strict liability, one
is confined to a narrow group of undertakings that are almost invariably dangerous no matter where conducted, while the other is
sufficiently flexible to apply to activities that are dangerous only
because of where they are conducted. As applied, however, the

two doctrines hardly arouse enthusiasm among those seeking clarity. Many decisions rendered in the name of ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity cannot be reconciled with their namesakes, with one another, or with the fundamental objectives of

strict liability.
One might expect a court following the first Restatement to
find land burial of toxic or inflammable substances an inherently

dangerous activity conducted by only a small segment of society.
The logical judicial response based on the Restatement (Second)
would be that such an activity is abnormally dangerous when pursued in a populated locale. The cases, however, belie all such attempts to create predictability. Despite the 1939 Restatement's apparent disregard for locale, many decisions purporting to apply an
ultrahazardous analysis do in fact consider the surroundings in

228. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938). The "not a matter of common
usage" requirement has been explained in terms of non-reciprocal risks. Strict liability is invoked only where the defendant has created a disproportionately great risk of
harm in comparison to the victim's risk-creating capacity. This explains why use of
an automobile, a highly dangerous undertaking, is not subject to strict liability. Absent negligent maintenance or operation, the risks created by each motorist are essentially equivalent to those to which each motorist is subject. See Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 541-42, 547-48 (1972).

229. Some activities, such as the use of atomic energy, necessarily and inevitably involve major risks of harm to others, no matter how or where they
are carried on. Others, such as the storage of explosives, necessarily involve
major risks unless they are conducted in a remote place or to a very limited
extent. Still others . . . involve such a risk only because of the place where
they are carried on. In determining whether there is such a major risk, it
may therefore be necessary to take into account the place where the activity
is conducted....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, Comment g, at 38 (1976) (citation omitted).
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which the activity is conducted. 2 30 As one commentator suggests,
2 31
few, if any, activities are highly dangerous in all circumstances.
Even blasting, which epitomizes the ultrahazardous endeavor,
poses little risk when conducted in an isolated area. Many courts
have recognized this, and have been reluctant to attach the
ultrahazardous label without first taking a hard look at the facts
of the case. Thus, in California, a jurisdiction which expressly
adopted the ultrahazardous test, strict liability has been applied to
blasting in a developed area,2 32 but not to blasting in a deserted
3
one. 23
In addition, some courts use ultrahazardous or abnormally
dangerous terminology, but, in fact, disregard both Restatements,
and base their decisions on economic factors such as superior ability to bear or distribute the cost of injury. As a result, the same activity can be subject to strict liability in one jurisdiction, and the
negligence standard in another. An example of this inconsistency is
different courts' treatment of municipal underground water mains.
A Washington court applied the negligence standard to a water
main rupture which damaged a telephone company's underground
lines, 234 while an Iowa court allocated the economic burden of the
damage wrought by a rupture to the party best able to spread the
cost, by invoking strict liability on behalf of individual homeowners. 235
Finally, the Restatement (Second) encourages courts to approach abnormally dangerous activity on a case-by-case basis. The
essential inquiry is: Are this activity's "dangers and inappropriateness for the locality so great that, despite any usefulness it may
have for the community, it should be required as a matter of law to
pay for any harm it causes . . . ?"236 The Restatement (Second) admits its inability to further refine a definition, but proffers a list of
237
factors to be considered by courts in reaching their conclusions.
Relatively few cases have been decided which have applied these
230.

See, e.g., cases cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 59, § 78, at 513 n.61 & 62.

231. Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land, 3
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 376, 387 (1929).

232. Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 P. 395 (1886); Alonso v. Hills, 95
Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (1950).
233.

Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lumber Co., 152 Cal. 500, 93 P. 82 (1907).

234. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491
P.2d 1037 (1971).
235. Lubin v. Iowa City, 257 Iowa 383, 131 N.W.2d 765 (1964).
236.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, Comment f, at 38 (1976).

237. See id. § 519; note 226 supra.
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factors in an informative way, partly because only a handful of jurisdictions have adopted the abnormally dangerous test, 238 and

partly because courts using the test have tended to quote the Restatement (Second) at length, announce their conclusions, and omit
meaningful analysis.2 39 One of the few cases providing insight into
the type of evidence required to establish that an activity is abnormally dangerous is Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead,240 a New
York Court of Appeals decision, which does not bode well for victims of hazardous waste disposal. The trial court submitted the

case, which involved property damage caused by hydraulic dredging and landfilling, to the jury on a strict liability theory, which

had not been raised by the plaintiffs or developed during trial. 241
In ordering a new trial, the Court of Appeals indicated that to establish a proper case for strict liability, plaintiffs must not only
show that hydraulic landfilling, in these circumstances, posed grave

risks that could not be eliminated by reasonable care, but must
also submit evidence as to the availability and cost of alternative
methods. 24 2 "It is not insignificant that alternative methods, per-

haps more time-consuming and expensive but less dangerous,
.43
2.
might have been available to defendants .
The court's words have a distinct "negligence" ring. A plaintiff
who establishes the feasibility of a safer alternative comes perilously close to proving that the activity was conducted in an unreasonable (negligent) manner. 2 44 It appears that the courts may have
238.

States adopting the test by decision of their supreme courts include

Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington. See Clark-Aiken Co. v.
Cromwell-Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 323 N.E.2d 876 (1975); Doundoulakis v. Town
of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1977); McLane v.
Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970); Pacific Northwest Bell
Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491 P.2d 1037 (1971). States in which the
test has been applied by intermediate courts include Florida and New Mexico. See
Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Otero v. Burgess, 84
N.M. 575, 505 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. 1973).
239. See, e.g., Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 323
N.E.2d 876 (1975).
240. 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d 24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1977).
241. Id. at 446, 368 N.E.2d at 25-26, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
242. Id. at 448-49, 368 N.E.2d at 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
243. Id. at 450, 368 N.E.2d at 28, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
244. This point was not lost on the Supreme Court of Oregon. In McLane v.
Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970), the court stated that in
proving storage of large quantities of natural gas in a populated area is an abnormally
dangerous activity, plaintiff need not present evidence as to the manner of storage:
We do not believe .. .the manner of... storage is relevant .... If there is

a manner in which [gas] can be stored with the safety of a usual industrial
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turned the wheel full circle, with strict liability meeting negligence
head on. The effect of their collision is to place an evidentiary burden on plaintiffs which, particularly in the inactive, hazardous
waste disposal situation, will be difficult to sustain. Neither the
ultrahazardous test nor the abnormally dangerous test contemplates
activities in which there is a considerable hiatus between execution
and injury, and none of the cases decided under either test provides the answer to a crucial question: Does the court look to the
present or to the past when making its analysis?
The 1939 Restatement includes foreseeability as to the type of
harm inflicted and the class of persons injured as a prerequisite for
applying strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. 245 Cases applying the ultrahazardous test confirm that a defendant will not be
held responsible for unexpected occurrences absent a finding of
fault. 246 Although the Restatement (Second) has deleted direct reference to foreseeability,2 47 it remains part of the abnormally dangerous test by implication.2 48 This emphasis on foreseeability sugcommodity in the locality in question, its storage is not an abnormally dangerous activity. The result of the ability to store it with such safety is that it
would be negligence to store it in any other manner.
Id. at 331, 467 P.2d at 639.
245. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938). The actor is liable only to those
who he "should recognize as likely to be harmed" and then only for harm "which
makes the activity ultrahazardous .... ." Id.
246. The defendant's knowledge, prior to the injury, of the precise nature of
the harm which could result from his or her activity is pointed out by courts in most
ultrahazardous cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d
774, 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 138 (1967) (defendant demonstrated, by acquiring 9,100
acres surrounding test site and offering to purchase plaintiff's bordering property, his
awareness that vibrations from test firing of rocket motor could cause property damage to neighboring landowners); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1
(1948) (defendant exterminator demonstrated his awareness that hydrocyanic acid gas
is lethal, highly penetrating, and can endanger those entering building, hours after
fumigation has been completed, as defendant took every precaution to seal area in
question before releasing gas and post warnings on building's doors because of possible gas leakage).
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976) continues to limit liability to the kind of harm which makes the activity abnormally dangerous, but contains
no language limiting liability to persons recognized by the actor as likely to be
harmed by the activity's miscarriage. See note 226 supra.
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159, Comment d, at 35 (1976) states:
"The defendant is held liable although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
the harm to the plaintiff that has ensued. The liability arises out of the abnormal
danger of the activity itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity." Id. (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, Comment on Clause (e), at 41 (1976),
points out that the storage of explosives in a desert area is not abnormally dangerous,
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gests that courts deciding inactive, hazardous waste disposal site
cases will look to the time of disposal in order to determine
whether strict liability is appropriate. It further suggests that
where the nature and magnitude of the risk could not be anticipated at the time of disposal because the locale was undeveloped
(and, arguably, appropriate) and the harmful potential of the substances was scientifically unascertainable, strict liability for
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity will not be
invoked. To a plaintiff who is forced to muster evidence as to the
defendant's knowledge at the time of disposal or suffer defeat,
strict liability is hardly a panacea.
One can hope that a long overdue reaction is in its nascence.
A recent decision in New Jersey, a state whose problems of chemical pollution entitle it to deference as an authority on the subject,2 49 concluded that a series of owners of a mercury-processing

plant were all liable for the pollution of an adjacent creek. 250 The
court found that "the conduct . . . was reasonable in light of the

state of knowledge as it then existed" 251 and that "[n]egligence as a
basis for nuisance liability has not been demonstrated." 252 However, the court determined that a public nuisance existed, and
imposed liability based on a "determination that the manufacturor
[sic] of products utilizing chemicals or other pollutants which may
cause harm if they escape into the environment should subject the
producer to strict liability, irrespective of reasonable care, if in fact
environmental pollution occurs."253

The court did not find it necessary to inquire into the locale's
suitability, apply the factors suggested by the Restatement (Second), or analyze whether the activity was inherently dangerous. Its
attention focused on underlying policy considerations, and its
straightforward approach is illustrated by the following:
while the same activity undertaken in the midst of a city is. Arguably, this is merely
another way of inteijecting the foreseeability limitation into the analysis. No matter
how intrinsically dangerous the activity, strict liability is not applied where the defendant could not foresee that physical injury or property damage would result.
249. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1981, § 2, at 1, col. 3; id., Dec. 18, 1980, § 2, at 1,
col. 3; Apr. 24, 1980, § 2, at 2, col. 5; id., Apr. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 2; id., Feb. 20,
1980, §2, at 2, col 1; id., Feb. 7, 1980, §2, at 1, col. 1; id., Aug. 27, 1979, §2, at 1, col
6; id., Apr. 22, 1979, §5, at 5, col 1.
250. New Jersey v. Ventron Corp., Nos. C-2996-75 (Super. Ct., Ch. Div. Bergen
County, Aug. 27, 1979).
251. Id. at 50.
252. Id. at 51.
253. Id. at 53.
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As we become more sensitive to our environment and more
aware of the impact of pollution upon the environment, we must
demand that the unchecked development of products which release pollutants into our environment be controlled. It does not
offend this Court's sensitivities nor infringe upon a manufacturing defendant's constitutional rights to impose strict liability
upon a defendant who, during the course of a profit making venture, discharges into the environment a dangerous or hazardous
pollutant, which results in damage or harm to the public,
notwithstanding254an absence of intent or negligence on the part of
the defendant.
Unfortunately, experience to date with strict liability indicates that
notions of fault die hard. 2 55 Notwithstanding the harms that may
be caused by industrial activity, courts appear reluctant to "punish"
a seemingly responsible enterprise by requiring it to pay for dam25 6
age it might not have been able to prevent.
OBSTACLES INHERENT IN HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION

Regardless of the legal theory upon which they rely, many of
those injured by toxic substances emanating from landfills will encounter procedural and practical difficulties inherent in the judicial
system itself. These include the running of the statute of limita-

tions, proof of causation, and the delay and expense normally accompanying litigation.

One of the major obstacles facing litigants will be the running
of the statute of limitations in jurisdictions not employing a broad
discovery rule. 2 57 Many state courts hold that a personal injury
254. Id. at 54-55.
255. See Polelle, supra note 210, at 103-09.
256. Id. at 104-05. Polelle characterizes the policies underlying strict tort liability as falling into two broad categories: (1) The "incentive" theory, which seeks to
encourage safer products and conduct; and (2) the "risk allocation" theory, which
seeks to place the financial burden of injurious products or conduct on the party best
able to spread the loss. His contention is that so long as the former continues to
dominate judicial thought, subtle aspects of forseeability will be retained in the common law approach to strict liability.
257. The statute of limitations will be an important issue in private suits arising

out of the Love Canal situation. New York applies a discovery rule in tort cases
involving fraud and foreign objects left inside the bodies of surgical patients. However, the New York Court of Appeals has consistently refused to extend a discovery
rule to claims for personal injury due to exposure to toxic substances. See STATE OF
NEw YORK, DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, supra note 127, Appendix A
at 78-83. The court's reluctance was illustrated most recently in Thornton v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), a products liability case in which plaintiffs decedent was injected years earlier with a
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claim accrues at the time of plaintiff's initial contact with the causa-

tive agent, not when the effect of such contact was or should have
been discovered.258 Since many harmful substances remain latent
in the body for prolonged periods or work insidiously over many

years, symptoms of disease may not become apparent until well
after the statutory period has been exhausted. Among states having
a discovery rule, the definition of "discovery" varies. 25 9
At disposal sites, where toxic substances have entered the atmosphere or the ground or drinking water, the initial contact with
contaminants may not produce any injurious effect. The onset of
physical or mental illness may not occur until substantial quantities

of contaminants have been ingested over time. 260 Even after exposure to medically significant levels of contamination, symptoms of

disease may develop slowly, and be difficult to identify at their
early stages. 26 1 Where the substances involved are odorless and
tasteless, as in the case of radiation poisoning, for example, the

causal connection between a dump site, possibly located miles
away, and the symptoms experienced may not be made for a concancer-causing agent in order to facilitate the taking of X-rays. Despite a strong dissent by Judge Jacob D. Fuchsberg, the majority declined "the invitation to extend
judicially the discovery rule," stating that "[s]uch matter is best reserved for the
Legislature, and not the courts." 47 N.Y.2d at 781-82, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 922 (citations omitted).
Efforts by New York legislators to enact a discovery rule appliable to the hazardous waste situation have, as of this writing, fallen prey to the cumbersome legislative
process. A bill, A.8789, adding a two-year discovery rule to the existing three-year
personal injury and property damage statute of limtations, was passed in the New
York State Assembly on June 5, 1980. See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1980, at 38, col. 1. In
addition to providing a discovery rule option for harms arising from exposure to or
contact with hazardous wastes, the bill revives expired claims for a period of one
year. Id. Its Senate counterpart, S.9642, introduced on Apr. 28, 1980, was still in
committee at the close of the 1980 legislative session.
258. See, e.g., Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963); Thornton v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See generally Hutton, Statute of Limitations and Radiation Injury, 23 TENN. L. REV. 278

(1954).
259. See Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying
Michigan law) (discovery occurred when cause of convulsions learned); Roman v.
A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Texas law) (discovery
occurred when plaintiff learned of illness due to drug); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Arkansas law) (discovery occurred when
disease fully manifested, not at discovery of earliest symptom); Gilbert v. Jones, 523
S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974) (discovery occurred when causal connection
learned).
260.

COUNCIL

ON

ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY,

ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY

-1979, at 194-230 (1979) (The Tenth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental
Quality).
261. Id.
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siderable period. This will be particularly true where instances of
illness are not sufficiently numerous or similar to alert residents of
an affected area to the need for expert investigation. As a result,
plaintiffs with meritorious claims may be denied their day in court
in jurisdictions not employing a discovery rule or those defining
discovery narrowly, so to toll the statute before the causal connection has been recognized.
Proof of causation will also present difficulties which transcend
the boundaries of any particular cause of action. As one writer in
the field of compensation for environmental harms has concluded,
"[p]roducing the evidentiary showing required to sustain the substantive proof of legal causation is an undertaking of no small magnitude."2 62 To establish causation, the law requires the tracing of a
linear cause-and-effect relationship between defendant's acts and
plaintiff's injury.263 This relationship will often be attenuated where injurious materials from disposal sites are involved. The
difficulty and expense of proving the initial links in the chain of
causation-the presence of significant amounts of toxic substances,
the manner in which exposure occurred, and the liability-forming
conduct on the part of an identifiable waste generator, hauler, or
site owner-have been dealt with above. 26 4 In addition to these elements, the final link in the chain-that particular buried wastes
are the cause in fact of plaintiff's illness-must be proved.
This task will be formidable because chemicals released into
groundwater or the atmosphere may combine with one another to
form new compounds, and may change their characteristics or become diluted when exposed to the elements. In addition, the responses which contaminants produce after human ingestion may
vary both temporally and in kind from individual to individual,
making it difficult to attribute a particular illness to a particular
chemical or combination of chemicals. 265 Consequently, where several potentially hazardous substances are present, plaintiffs may be
unable to show that their injuries resulted from exposure to one
whose source or hauler is before the court or one over which the
defendant site owner exercised control. Particularly where disease
262. Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of
Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV.J. LEGIS. 683, 706 (1977).
263. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-453 (1965); NV. PROSSER,
supra note 59, § 43, at 263-64.
264. See text accompanying notes 117-148 supra.
265. See Soble, supra note 262, at 705 n.62.
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becomes manifest only after a prolonged period, as in the case of
carcinogens, the question of intervening or contributing causes may
add to the uncertainty. The difficulty of establishing a direct causal

link between one of several substances deposited in 1950 and
symptoms of cancer first recognized in 1978 is apparent. If the af-

fected plaintiff is also a tobacco user or worked in a chemical plant,
the level of certainty required by the legal system may be impossi-

2 66
ble to attain.

Proof of legal causation will necessitate expert testimony in
several disciplines and extensive scientific data, including the re-

sults of epidemiological studies. Plaintiffs' evidence may be rebutted by evidence equally technical and complex. Some of the

difficulties that may arise are illustrated by the incongruous results
of health surveys conducted at the Love Canal by the New York
State Health Department and Dr. Beverly Paigen. 26 7 The net effect is to require that judges and juries evaluate information in

fields far removed from their usual areas of competence, and make
judgments based on conflicting and ambiguous data.2 68 Their inability to determine with meaningful certainty that the materials in

266. For a discussion of the difficulty of proving a direct causal connection between radiation exposure and leukemia or other forms of cancer, see Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59
MICH. L. REV. 259, 268-80 (1960). The problem is no less acute with regard to toxic
substances in general. Soble, supra note 262, at 737-42.
267. The Paigen study was labeled unworthy of being "taken seriously as a
piece of sound epidemiologic research" by a five-member panel of reknowned scientists appointed on June 4, 1980 by New York Governor Carey to evaluate the effects
of hazardous waste exposure at the Love Canal. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1980, at 25, col.
5. The panel also dismissed an EPA chromosomal study which revealed increased
occurrence of rare chromosome abnormalities among the area's residents, as "inadequate" and damaging to "the credibility of science." Id. The Governor's panel concluded: "There has been no demonstration of acute health effects linked to exposure
to hazardous wastes at the Love Canal site." Id. In Nov. 1980, Hooker published a
public-relations pamphlet which uses excerpts from the panel's report to suggest that
the characterization of the Love Canal as a public-health disaster is unsupported by
sound scientific evidence and was merely an effort by the State to procure federal
disaster funding. See HOOKER CHEMICAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T, No DEMONSTRATED HEALTH EFFECTS FROM LOVE CANAL CHEMICALS, SAYS MEDICAL REVIEW STUDY (HOOKER, FACTLINE No. 12, Nov. 1980).

268. The inability of courts to resolve highly technical scientific issues is
pointed out by David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in his article, Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205 SciENCE 277, 277-80 (1979). For an example of judicial refusal to evaluate conflicting
technical data, see Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 507 n.20 (8th Cir.
1975).
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question were the cause of injury may result in denying plaintiffs'
26 9
claims.
Delay is yet another impediment to adequate recovery, a potent defense rarely appearing in the pleadings. Disposal sites are
often situated near the manufacturing concerns they service, and
residents of communities surrounding industrial areas tend to belong to a segment of society rarely able to accumulate significant financial reserves. Where such people incur medical expenses, suffer
loss of income, or are forced to abandon their homes, their need
for compensation is immediate and frequently desperate. Due to
the backlog of court cases plaguing most jurisdictions, the delaying
procedural devices available to defendants, and the complex, technical nature of the evidence presented at trial, a favorable
decision-if one is forthcoming-may be years in the making. For
plaintiffs who cannot pay for medical treatment or alternative housing, a legal remedy permeated with uncertainty and delay may be
equivalent to no remedy at all, and the lure of a prompt settle2 70
ment, however inadequate, may be irresistable.
Time also figures prominently in the problem of litigation
costs. The injured plaintiff with a promising cause of action may
find an attorney willing to take his or her case on a contingent fee
basis. While such an arrangement will lessen plaintiff's immediate
financial burden, the contingent fee can operate as an obstacle to
optimum recovery. In the face of deferred and uncertain payment,
counsel may be unwilling or unable to devote the considerable
time and energy necessary to fully explore and develop all relevant
issues, and may be unduly receptive to settlement opportuni2 71
ties.
Though payment of legal fees may not be an immediate concern, the scientific studies necessary to identify the harmful agent,
trace it to its source, and prove that it entered plaintiff's body and
caused harm will require a sizeable outlay which probably cannot
be deferred. While multiple plaintiffs can share litigation costs in

269. Estep likens such judgments to a "gambler's system of justice," in which
some claimants recover and others do not, depending on a lucky turn of the roulette
wheel or a fortunate lottery draw. Estep, supra note 266, at 280.
270. For a discussion of settlement in toxic substance injury cases, see Soble,
supra note 262, at 712-14. On the lure of settlement in community disaster cases, see
Rabin, Dealing With Disasters: Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1978).
271. See generally Rabin, supra note 270, at 291, 295.
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situations amenable to class actions, such costs may easily total
close to a million dollars. 272 Additionally, class actions may not be
available unless "questions of. . . fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members ....
"273 Although the creative use of class action suits
in this type of situation has yet to be fully explored,2 74 it is possible that the highly individualized issue of causation will not lend it-

self to representative adjudication.2 7 5 Ultimately, the extraordinary

expense involved in pursuing a judicially imposed remedy may re-

sult in abandoning claims or unsatisfactory settlements.
Plaintiffs' ability to gain compensation will also be hindered by
circumstances over which the judicial system has no control. Due

to passage of time, lack of records, and the covert, illicit practices
of unscrupulous dumpers, there may be no identifiable party
against whom claims can be pursued. A study conducted for the
EPA indicated that many of the 1,200 to 2,000 imminently danger-

ous waste dump sites around the country are "abandoned" in that
the original owner or dumper either cannot be identified or is not
financially responsible. 2 76 It is estimated that the cost of treating
these sites before they develop into health hazards could be as
high as 32.3 billion dollars. 2 77 This figure not only suggests that the

272. See id.; note 163 supra.
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). A predomination requirement also exists in most
state class action statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b)(2) (West 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, CH. CT. R. 23(b)(3) (1975); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 901(a)(2)
(McKinney 1976); OHiO REV. CODE ANN., R. Civ. P. 23(B)(3) (1980).

274. See generally Hinds, To Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class
Action Act, 13 HARV. J. LEcIS. 776 (1976); Note, Class Action in a Products Liability
Context: The Predomination Requirement and Cause-in-Fact, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
859 (1979).
275. In Wojciechowski v. Republic Steel Corp., 67 App. Div. 2d 830, 413
N.Y.S.2d 70 (4th Dep't 1979), class certification was denied in part because whether
dust from the defendant's plant was the cause-in-fact of plaintiffs' property damage
was held a question requiring individual determinations. Id. at 830, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
71. Similarly, in Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196
(2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1978), class certification was denied in a strict products liability claim against the
manufacturer of an intrauterine device (IUD) because whether the IUD was the
cause-in-fact of plaintiffs' pelvic injuries was held a question requiring individual determinations. Id. at 20, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 201. If the predomination requirement can be
satisfied only in cases where the cause-in-fact issue can be resolved on a classwide
basis, those injured by hazardous wastes have little hope of pursuing their claims in
a class action.
276.

HART REPORT, supra note 20, at 9.

277. Id. at 37-B.
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prospects for prompt nationwide clean-up are poor, but that many
of those destined to be harmed will have to rely on the magnanimity of state and local governments for relief.
With distressing regularity, additional inactive, hazardous
waste disposal sites are being discovered, 2 78 but in most instances
the generators of the materials and the parties responsible for their
disposal remain unascertained. It was recently revealed that residents of several northern suburbs of Memphis, Tennessee are
experiencing severe health problems, believed to stem from toxic
substances buried beneath or adjacent to their homes. 2 79 The EPA
has been unable to pinpoint the location of the materials, and the
identity of those responsible for their burial remains a matter of
speculation and rumor. 28 0 In Jackson Township, New Jersey, 96
families whose wells were polluted by toxic and carcinogenic chemicals are suing the township, charging mismanagement of a nearby
landfill. 28 1 The state license for the dump did not permit the

landfill to accept hazardous wastes. The town's attorney maintains,
however, that this site, like others across the state, was used illegally by industrial concerns and haulers who either misinformed
caretakers of the contents of proffered cargoes or dumped surreptitiously at night. 2 2 In these and similar situations, where the identity of those responsible for the presence of injurious substances is
unknown, the courts cannot effectuate remedies.
Moreover, even where a responsible party is identified and
found liable, judicial remedies may be ineffective. Considering the
magnitude of the sums potentially involved, it is possible that none
of the culpable defendants will have sufficient financial assets or insurance coverage to respond fully in damages. Not all waste generators will be giant corporations in their own right or divisions or
wholly owned subsidiaries of vast industrial complexes.28 3 The list
of generators in Erie and Niagara Counties, New York, compiled
by the Interagency Task Force on Hazardous Wastes, indicates that

278.
60-66.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
pensation
mination.

See Magnuson, The Poisoning of America, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 58,
N.Y. Times, March 22, 1980, at 6, col. 2.
Id.
Id., Feb. 7, 1980, § 2, at 1, col. 1; id. at 5, col. 2.
Id.
Even where generators are affiliates of huge industrial complexes, commay turn upon a highly discretionary "piercing the corporate veil" deter-
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smaller, local firms may be involved. 28 4 The Task Force Report

also suggests that waste haulers are frequently relatively small enterprises, as 133 haulers of industrial wastes, excluding common
carriers, were identified in the two counties alone. 28 5 In addition,

given the extended time lapse between waste disposal and subsequent harm, it is likely that a significant number of participants
286
will be out of business and beyond the reach of the courts.

Site owners may be equally unsatisfactory as potential sources
of compensation. In some instances, they may have purchased subsequent to the time of disposal and be unconnected with waste
generation or disposal, or even unaware that their property contains toxic substances. Mere ownership of property, without con-

duct unreasonable under the circumstances, does not carry with it
liability for pollution initiated by third parties. 287 Even were such
not the case, it is conceivable that the present owners of an inac-

tive disposal site will be private residents or small businesses incapable of meeting substantial judgments. Where a public entity
holds title to a former landfill, the complexities of timely notice of
claim 28 8 and sovereign immunity may impede recovery. 28 9 If a municipality is forced to pay large judgments, those sums will be reflected in tax increases, the burden of which will fall, in part, on
the injured victims.

284.

The TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at Ill-1 to -148, describes the ac-

tivities of 80 different hazardous waste generators, including private companies,
power plants, and federal government facilities. Although many of the companies included in the Report bear internationally known names, e.g., Allied Chemical Corporation and E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., at least 10 of the generators described are
relatively small regional businesses unaffiliated with larger concerns. Id.
285. Id. at IV-1.
286. The Task Force Report acknowledges that some of the haulers described
may no longer be in operation. Id.
287. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
288. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1977) provides that notice of
tort claims against a public corporation must be served within 90 days after the claim
arises. Section 50-e(5) provides that the court, in its discretion, may extend the time
to serve a notice of claim. However, such extension cannot be for longer than the applicable statute of limitations, and the factors to be considered in determining
whether to grant an extension do not include failure by the claimant to discover the
fact of his or her injury within the 90 day period. Id.
289. See Skillern, Private Environmental Litigation: Some Problems and Pitfalls, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 675, 733 (1978). See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review
of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387
(1970).
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Although some of the impediments to recovery can be eased
by legislation mandating strict liability, a broad discovery rule,
more liberal standards of proof on the issue of causation, and procedures designed to accelerate the judicial process, such reforms
cannot create financial responsibility in otherwise impecunious defendants. In the last analysis, the efficacy of the legal system as a
means of compensating victims of toxic wastes will be determined
by a bottom line on a balance sheet. Too often this figure will
prove inadequate to compensate fully a stricken community.
THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE

As has been shown, a judicial remedy is usually unavailable or
inadequate where harms from hazardous wastes are concerned. An
alternative to judicial recourse must be created to compensate victims. It can be argued, of course, that existing sources of compensation are sufficient, and if they prove inadequate, the losses suffered are an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of living in an
industrialized society. Most private losses are compensated through
private insurance or tort litigation, rather than by public mechanisms.
Such an argument, however, assumes the availability of insurance or judicial recourse, a fallacious assumption where harms from
hazardous wastes are concerned. It also ignores the distinction between isolated, random harms and community disasters such as the
Love Canal. 290 Our society has proven unwilling to permit citizens
290. See note 14 supra. Until 1978 when federal disaster aid was extended to
victims of the Love Canal, the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5189 (1976),
was interpreted to apply only to destruction by the elements, such as floods, storms,
and earthquakes. In Alabama in 1970, for example, victims of mercury contamination
were held ineligible for aid. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, 9qTH CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WATER POLLUTION 225-29 (Comm. Print 1979). "Major disaster" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2)

(1976). The Disaster Relief Act lists examples of natural disasters and refers to "other
catastroph[es which cause] damage of sufficient severity and magnitude." Id. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1978 to supersede
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41,943, 92 Stat. 3790. The change in nonmenclature reflects the
expanded interpretation of the act in recent years.
The Disaster Relief Act, however, is an inadequate solution to the problem of industrial hazardous waste since it is designed to mitigate the immediate hardships
caused by the widespread destruction of natural disasters. It assumes that most of the
property damage can be restored and that there will be few, if any, long term health
effects. Under the Disaster Relief Act, the President is authorized to provide rentfree temporary housing and unemployment assistance, but these provisions expire
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to die of starvation or disease because of lack of funds. Thus, in the
absence of effective private remedies, the financial burden of providing for those injured by hazardous wastes will ultimately fall on
the taxpayers. A key issue in compensating victims is how the financial burden will be allocated between the public and those industries that have been and will continue to be the source of harm.
It would appear undesirable, unnecessary, and inequitable to burden the taxpayer for harms caused by the profit oriented manufacturing and disposal activities of particular industries.
In our view, a mechanism must be created to compensate the
victims of hazardous wastes at the expense of industries that have
created and are creating those wastes. Such an approach is in accordance with a "polluter pays" principle that has been supported
by our government in an international forum. 291 It is consistent
with popular notions of fairness and equity. 292 Such notions aside,
this approach is desirable on economic grounds. If the full societal
cost of manufacture is not incorporated in the price of the waste
producing products, such products will have an unwarranted advantage in the marketplace. They will be artificially "cheap," and
will supersede more benign alternative products or prevent their
introduction. 293 In effect, the waste producing products will be
subsidized by their unwitting and unwilling victims.
In order to shift the cost of compensation to the products
whose manufacture causes the harm, a procedure must be created
one year after the major disaster or emergency is declared. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5174, 5177
(1976). No reference is made to any long-term health effects.

291.

OECD,

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE § 1 (Nov. 14, 1974).
292. Members of the public who testified in response to the Love Canal tragedy expressed an almost unanimous point of view: Hooker had harmed innocent persons and should pay for the harm. See, e.g., Love Canal Hearings, supra note 5, May
2, 1979, 2d Sess., at 103 (statement of Marshall Ausuebel); id. at 35-40 (statement of
Lester Milbrath, Director, Environmental Studies Center, State University of New
York at Buffalo); id., May, 1, 1979, 2d Sess., at 16 (statement of James Hoffman,

Niagara County Environmental Council); id., 1st Sess., at 72 (statement of Joan
Gipp, Councilwoman, Town of Lewistown, Niagara County).
293. This assumes, of course, that alternative products with similar characteristics are available. Even if not, some reduction in the volume of sales should occur,
depending upon the elasticity of demand. Many products which are the source of
hazardous wastes are, in turn, used in the production of other commodities (i.e. agricultural goods) or as component parts of other manufactured products (i.e. automobiles). If such materials cannot be replaced, or their volume reduced, the
internalization of cost will result in an increased market price for the end products.
The nature of such increases will depend on the ratio of the cost of the original
waste producing materials to the total value of the end product.
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which spreads the burden consistently among the affected industries (and their customers) and does not, as now, depend on the
uncertainties of litigation. Such a procedure's primary goal would
be compensating the injured, many of whose harms were caused
by events predating the enactment of RCRA. Admittedly, spreading the cost of particular accidents on the waste generating industry as a whole, will not necessarily provide an incentive for safer
disposal practices. However, the behavior modifying aspects of individual liability should be less necessary if the federal regulatory
scheme imposed by RCRA is effective. That statute provides, inter
alia, for the identification of hazardous wastes, 294 minimum standards for generators, transporters, and owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities, 295 and use of a manifest system to track hazardous wastes from "cradle to grave." 296 Permits are required for
hazardous wastes facilities, 29 7 and state hazardous waste programs
are authorized. 298 As the regulations necessary to implement
RCRA are promulgated and enforced, 299 irresponsible conduct
should be appreciably reduced.
A compensation system must obviate the need to identify a
culpable party with resources sufficient to provide restitution, and
eliminate the costs, delays, and evidentiary burdens associated
with the judicial process. The creation of a fund against which
those injured may present their claims, and which is administered
to facilitate the validation of claims, is the best solution to the compensation dilemma. The fund must be at a federal level since individual states will be reluctant to create a climate hostile to industry
by imposing costs not existing in friendlier jurisdictions.300
The 96th Congress struggled with this issue for many
months. 301 The Administration introduced "Superfund" legislation
294. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1976).

295. Id. §§ 6922-6924.
296. Id. § 6822(5).
297. Id. § 6925.
298. Id. § 6926.
299. See note 19 supra.
300. State inactivity to date is probably a reflection of this concern. See note 15

supra.
301. See Environmental Emergency Response Act, S.1480, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, S.2631, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. Rxc. S14,949-62 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980); Hazardous Waste Containment Act of 1980, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H9,437-77
(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980); Hazardous Waste Act of 1980, H.R. 6931, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980); Hazardous Waste Response Fund Act of 1979, H.R. 5790, 96th Cong.,
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directed toward the financing of remedial action, but which ignored issues of victim compensation. 30 2 A House bill emerged that
followed the Administration's approach, 30 3 while the Senate ap30 4
proved a comprehensive bill that included a compensation fund.
In the waning days of the Carter presidency it was feared that the

differences between the House and Senate versions of hazardous
waste legislation would result in a stalemate, leaving the problem
to the ministrations of the 97th Congress, a conclusion apparently
favored by the Chemical Manufacturers Association. 30 5 The Superfund" was salvaged on November 24, 1980 when the Senate ac-

cepted the House bill. A "cleanup" fund was created at the price
of sacrificing 6victim compensation as well as strict liability for waste
generators.

30

1st Sess. (1979); Hazardous Waste Control and Toxic Tort Act of 1979, H.R. 5291,

96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Oil, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Waste Response, Liability and Compensation Act of 1979, S.1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. S7,445-47 (daily ed. June 12, 1979). For a review of the legislation introduced in the 96th Congress on this subject, see J. Blodgett, Toxic Substance Combination: Compensation Issues (updated to June 10, 1980) (Environment and Natural
Resources Policy Div., Issue Brief No. IB77019); M. Reisch, Environmental Protection: Hazardous Wastes (updated to June 4, 1980) (Environment and Natural Resources Policy Div., Issue Brief No. IB79088).
302. See H.R. 4571, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4566, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979); S1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S7,696-7,706 (daily ed.
June 14, 1979). The latter makes provision for the recovery of property damage in
§ 607, but none for medical expense, lost earnings or personal injury.
303. Hazardous Waste Containment Act of 1980, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H9,437-77 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
304. Environmental Emergency Response Act, S.1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
126 CONG. REC. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980); the bill provided for strict liability for personal injury, including medical expenses and lost earnings, id. § 4(a), at
S14,940, and permitted recovery for such damages from a federal fund, id.
§ 6(b)(3)(D), at 814,946.
305. See Save the Superfund, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1980, at 22, col. 1. Robert
Roland (President of the Chemical Manufacturer's Association) has repeatedly criticized federal efforts to frame legislation that requires the industrial polluters to
pay most of the planned superfund. See, e.g., Panel Backs Fund for Waste Cleanup,
N.Y. Times, June 19, 1980, at 16, col. 1. The Chemical Manufacturer's Association, in
addition to its lobbying efforts in Washington, has undertaken a campaign to convince the public that the chemical industry is safeguarding the country's waterways.
A recent advertisement in the New York Times, for example, portrayed the chemical
industry as a promoter of cleaning up America's lakes and waterways. Chemical
Manufacturer's Assoc., Protecting America's Water, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1980, § 1,
at 15, col. 4.
306. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (text at 126 CONG. REC.
S14,988-15,002 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)); cf. S.1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG.
REC. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)). See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1980, at
22, col. 1.
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While a federal hazardous waste compensation fund may be
unlikely in the immediate future, the need for such legislation is
certain to increase if injuries and property damage continue to occur. A federal compensation fund, when enacted, should contain
certain basic elements, many of which were in the 1980 Senate
proposal. The revenues for the fund must be adequate, and the
revenue raising structure must be relatively simple to administer
and enforce. Claimants must have access to an affordable forum
which renders consistent decisions, and the remedies available to
them must be adequate to meet their costs and losses. The following discussion identifies some of the essential components of a national compensation program for harms caused by hazardous
wastes, and incorporates the authors' views on the shape such a
7
program should take.30
Structuring the Fund
Exclusive Remedy.-The Fund should be the exclusive source
of compensation for property damage or personal injury caused by
exposure to hazardous wastes. As a political matter, industry can
hardly be expected to support the equivalent of a mandatory insurance system if doing so does not insulate it from the costs of litigation.30 8 Claimants should have no need to resort to the courts if
307. The federal bills referred to, see note 301 supra, are not the first attempts
to draft legislation on this issue. An ambitious model statute designed to compensate
all victims of toxic substance pollution (not limited to those harmed by waste materials escaping from land disposal sites) is set forth in Soble, supra note 262, at 769. The
authors acknowledge their debt to Mr. Soble for his excellent work based upon the
Japanese system of compensating the victims of pollution-caused diseases. For a
discussion of that approach, see Gresser, The 1973 Japanese Law for the Compensation of Pollution-RelatedHealth Damage: An IntroductoryAssessment, 5 ENVT'L L.
REP. 50,229 (1975); Soble, supra note 262.

308. Historically, workers' compensation achieved support from industry because it provided an alternative to tort liability. De Leon, Workers' Compensation: A
Legal System in Jeopardy, FIG Q., Summer 1979, at 337, 338. Professor Gresser compares the current state of compensation for environmental injuries to the period prior
to workers' compensation:
In some ways our era resembles the state of the law of industrial accidents
prior to the development of workmen's compensation. The law of pollution
damage still views the problem as an individual struggle between polluters
and victims. As a consequence, procedural barriers to class actions, the public nuisance doctrine, and difficulties in proving disease causation from multiple sources of pollution present powerful obstacles to relief, as did the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
rule a half century ago. Since most United States courts have refused to disturb these barriers to victim recovery, the economic forces which impelled
the American business community to seek a more certain, less expensive,
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they have been made whole through administrative processes.3 0 9

If, as is our contention, the courts are an inefficient and unsatisfactory forum in which to redress the harms caused by hazardous
waste disposal, the alternative mechanism should remove the issue
from judicial cognizance.
Charges.-A critical aspect of any compensation strategy is the
manner in which revenues are raised. Ease of administration, while
an important consideration, is not the sole criterion for the revenue
raising structure. The economic effect of the charge on industry,
and the consequences in the marketplace are primary concerns.
Charges could be levied on the raw materials whose processing results in the creation of most of the more hazardous
wastes, or, in the alternative, could be imposed on the waste mate-

rials themselves.
A "front end" charge on raw materials is easier to administer

than a charge on waste, as records are more likely to be available
and reliable for the former. 310 This is the approach adopted by the

Superfund legislation. A tax is levied on crude petroleum delivered
to United States refineries and on imported petroleum products. 31 1

A tax is also imposed on specified "chemicals," particularly solvents
and heavy metals. 312 If the costs are imposed on the front end of
the manufacturing process as a charge on certain raw materials, the

increased expense will be an incentive to use such materials more
efficiently. This could result in a reduction in the volume of waste
vehicle for compensating workers have not yet been unleashed in the pollution field.
Gresser, supra note 307, at 50, 230-31 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
309. In addition, the behavior-modifying aspects of the imposition of liability
on polluters should be less necessary if the federal regulatory scheme imposed by
RCRA is effective. The regulations necessary to implement RCRA are slowly being
promulgated. See notes 19, 294-299 supra and accompanying text.
310. Purchases of raw materials are reflected on the books of the seller as well
as the buyer, whereas records showing the volume and nature of waste are in the
sole control of the generator. Even when the manifest system required by RCRA, 42
U.S.C. § 6922(5) (1976), is fully implemented, opportunities for evasion will include
the falsification of the volume or nature of wastes and "informal" disposal along
roadsides at night or in municipal sewer systems. See note 89 supra.
By contrast, an attempt by a manufacturer to understate raw material purchases
could work to his detriment at income tax time. The false reduction in costs would
result in a painful inflation of taxable profit. If the volume of raw material purchases
were understated, it would be difficult to reconcile the quantity of raw materials
consumed with the quantity of end product.
311. Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 4611, 94 Stat. 2767 (Dec. 11, 1980) (126 CONG. REC.
S14,988-15,002 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)).
312. Id. § 4661, 94 Stat. 2768.
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produced, but not necessarily its hazardous nature. However, a reduction will occur only if the investment in equipment and systems
which will increase efficiency, together with any related increases
in operating costs, does not exceed the savings obtained from the
reduced use of raw materials.
A tariff on the wastes themselves would provide an incentive to
reduce their toxicity and volume, and would appear to be the most
direct approach. For maximum impact, a "waste charge" should be
based on quantity and concentration in order to reflect the hazards
posed by individual substances or classes of substances. This risk assessment might prove difficult in practice,3 13 but would encourage
industry to minimize the production of hazardous materials. A variant of the waste charge imposed on the generator of the material
would be one imposed on the owners or operators of waste disposal
facilities. 314 This approach has serious drawbacks. By increasing the
cost of legitimate disposal, it acts as an incentive to illegal "midnight
dumping," a practice which enhances the risk of public exposure to
the wastes. 315 Also, even assuming that the manifest system mandated by RCRA is in effect, 316 it may be more difficult to trace
wastes to their final resting places and measure their quantity and
toxicity accurately, than to monitor the nature and volume of raw
materials initially consumed by manufacturers. 317

313. Toxicity and persistency are known for some substances, but are a matter
of speculation for others. Weighing the risks posed by toxicity against those of
flammability or explosiveness would require the wisdom of a Solomon. Some substances are, however, known to pose much greater risks than others. The evaluation
of relative risks has been required for the implementation of federal statutes such as
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858e (1976).
314. This funding strategy was adopted by S.1325, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
The bill proposed that the Secretary of the Treasury "set and collect from the operator of a hazardous waste management facility an annual nationally uniform premium
based upon the amount of hazardous wastes received for storage, treatment, transporting, or disposal in the hazardous waste management facility .. ."Id. § 4(c)(1).
315. See note 89 supra. A federal fund already exists for remedial work at hazardous waste sites-CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2797 (Dec. 11, 1980) (126
CONG. REC. S14,988-15,002 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)). We are suggesting that such a
fund include provisions for victim compensation. A third purpose of the fund could
be the subsidization of disposal facilities to reduce disposal costs. Such an approach
would be unnecessary, however, if the regulatory scheme created by the RCRA is effective. See notes 294-299 supra and accompanying text.
316. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6922(5) (1976), imposes a "cradle-to-grave" manifest
system for tracking hazardous waste and requires record keeping necessary to accomplish this objective.
317. See note 310 supra. It might also be argued that manufacturing firms are
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Size of the Fund.-Since it is impossible to estimate the eventual costs of remedial measures at waste disposal sites 318 and compensation for individuals who are harmed by hazardous wastes, the
Fund will be constantly depleted and must be replenished. 319 Site
cleanup and victim compensation are related issues. If dangerous
sites are identified and remedial measures taken promptly, the need
for compensating victims may be reduced. Experience to date, however, indicates that in many instances substantial
injuries occur be320
fore the hazard posed by a site is discovered.
The size of the Fund must reflect the nature of the remedies
that will be available. The need for a substantial sum has been recognized, 32 1 but demand on the assets will fluctuate as new sites are
discovered and injuries are demonstrated. Industry charges to support the Fund will require adjustment as needs become apparent. 322
Scope of Remedies.-Victims and their families should be compensated for all ascertainable actual losses. 323 To do otherwise,
would be to perpetuate the situation in which the consumers of the
products generating the wastes are involuntarily subsidized by the
victims. Medical expenses reasonably related to the toxic exposure324 should be paid to the extent that they are not covered by
more likely to keep accurate business records than the operators of waste disposal fa-

cilities. It has been alleged that organized crime is involved in waste disposal. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1980, § 2, at 1, col. 5; Newsday, May 23, 1980, at 7, col. 1. Such allegations are, thus far, unproven.
318. See HART REPORT, supra note 20.
319. See CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (Dec. 11, 1980) (revolving
fund provisions). State compensation funds are similarly structured. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 376.11 (Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 551(4) (1964); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 58:10-23.11h (West Supp. 1980).
320. Such was the case at the Love Canal. See text accompanying notes 40-43
supra. The same occurred at Memphis, Tenn. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1980, at 26, col. 5;
see note 89 supra.
321. Claims for damages resulting from the Love Canal are in excess of two billion dollars. See Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 69, 420 N.Y.S.2d
687, 689 (Sup. Ct., Niagara County 1979). It may be assumed, however, that these
claims are somewhat inflated for purposes of litigation.
322. Provisions of this nature have been incorporated in the 1980 "Superfund"
legislation. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (Dec. 11, 1980) (126 CONG. REC.
S14,988-15,002 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)).
323. The proposed fund should avoid the sad history of workers' compensation
in this respect. Limitations on recovery under state workers' compensation statutes
have been described as "inadequate and inequitable." De Leon, supra note 334, at
343; Soble, supra note 262, at 717-18 n.111 (both citing STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON S.2018, at 38

(Comm. Print, 1976)).
324. See text accompanying notes 147-151 supra; text accompanying notes
330-332 infra.
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existing private or public health insurance programs. From a logical point of view, it could be argued that all medical expenses
should be reimbursed even if other coverage exists, since maximum internalization of cost will thereby be achieved. An additional
rationale for such an approach is that the victim has paid the premiums for other health coverage. If the Fund paid all medical expenses, the additional "windfall" payment from private or group
health insurance would be in lieu of a return of premiums. As a
practical matter, however, such a policy might have an adverse impact on private premium rates. Other policyholders would be
subsidizing the victim's double recovery. The question would resolve itself within a short period of time in any event, since full
medical reimbursement by the Fund would probably result in
excluding from private policy coverage injuries caused by exposure
to hazardous wastes. This would have the desired effect of shifting
such costs from private plans to the Fund and, eventually, to the
consumers of products manufactured by contributors to the Fund.
Actual loss of income should be compensable by the Fund,
again, only to the extent that the victim is not paid by Workers'
Compensation or other public or private substitutes for earnings. 32 5
Those injured should receive payment at a rate equal to income
which they earned prior to the injury. 32 6 Injured minors should
not be compensated for future lost earnings until they reach their
majority. 32 7 If the victim at the time disability occurs is a nonearning adult, married or single, compensation should be based on
average regional earnings.
No death benefits should be paid, other than a lump sum sufficient to cover funeral and related expenses. However, if the decedent was a wage earner or receiving compensation for lost earnings, the decedent's spouse and minor children should continue to
receive an amount equal to the decedent's former earnings (as ad325. As with medical expenses, it can be argued that in order to achieve accu-

rate cost internalization, all losses should be reimbursed even if double recovery results.
326. Consideration might be given to an upper limit for lost earnings compensation. Any such cut-off should, however, be at a relatively high level. The victim
and the victim's family should not suffer a major dimunition of their standard of living because of the profit-oriented activities of the waste-creating industry. The Fund
should not discriminate among those injured based on their prior economic
capacities. To do so would result in the victim's subsidizing the waste generator's
customers.
327. If,
however, a minor was working at the time the disability occurred, compensation for lost earnings should follow.
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justed by the consumer price index) until the decedent's spouse
reaches 65 years of age or remarries. 3 28 The overall objective is to
compensate a victim of hazardous waste exposure for lost earnings
and for the services of a non-earning spouse if the spouse is disabled or dies prior to age 65.
Claims against the Fund for damages such as pain and suffering or loss of consortium should not be permitted. They are too
speculative in nature and would open the door to unlimited demands on the Fund's resources. Compensation for such harms cannot be quantified in a meaningful way on a consistent basis, and
can be analogous to punitive damages in effect.
The Fund should, of course, compensate for property loss.
This is relatively easy to compute if a home or business property
has been rendered uninhabitable or unusable. In such circumstances, the Fund should take title to the property, and the owner
should be paid the appraised value as if uncontaminated. More difficult issues arise, however, with respect to real estate which is not
contaminated, but which is substantially diminished in value because of its proximity to the waste disposal site. Value is a matter
of perception, and if property is believed to be contaminated, the
marketplace reflects that perception. Attitudes change with time,
however. If remedial action is taken at the site, nearby uncontaminated property may eventually regain a substantial part of
its normal market value. Short-term fluctuations in value are difficult to measure. The Fund should not attempt compensation for
partial losses of value, but should offer to buy any real property
within a given distance from the nearest contamination at its appraised value as if uncontaminated. Many residents will choose not
to sell and disrupt their lives if they are assured by health authorities that their homes are safe. Many of the properties that the
Fund does purchase will, in time, become marketable, and can be
resold.329

328. If the decedent had no spouse, but left minor children, lost earnings compensation should be paid to the minor children or to their guardian, until they reach
their majority. If the decedent's spouse were already receiving compensation from
the Fund at the time of the decedent's death, the surviving spouse should continue
to receive such compensation or the decedent's former earnings, whichever was
greater.
329. Since title to the properties will be held by a federal agency, they will be
immune from local real property taxation. United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174
(1944); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Procedures.-While a federally created fund will resolve the
obstacles to recovery posed by the lack of an identifiable and financially responsible defendant, it will provide limited satisfaction to
plaintiffs unless traditional standards of proof are modified. 330 A
two-step process should be created in order to substantiate claims
against the Fund. First, the claimant should be required to show
an injury which could have been caused by exposure to toxic
wastes, as well as a possible source of exposure. It should not be
necessary to identify the particular substance or substances causing
the injury. Statistical evidence could be used to show an increase
in the incidence of the injury or disease in the immediate geographic area in which the claimant was exposed. While a possible
pathway should be shown whereby the toxic substance or substances could have traveled from the waste source to the injured
party, definitive proof of the route should not be required. In
short, a presumption of causation would arise if the claimant makes
a prima facie showing that exposure to a toxic waste could have
331
been a substantial factor in the causation of an injury or disease.
330. One way in which proof of causation may be modified is demonstrated by
Professor Gresser, who analyzes the Japanese statute, K6gai Kenk6 Higai Hosh5 H6,
Law No. 111 (Oct. 5, 1973), as follows:
Under the Act victims are relieved of the burden of proving disease causation ....
Causation is handled in part as a statistical question. When a "signiflcant" correlation between disease and pollution is identified, causation is
inferred. Epidemiological analysis plays a crucial role in such determinations. Clinical and experimental data, as well as mortality and morbidity statistics are also carefully considered.
Gresser, supra note 307, at 50, 239 (footnotes omitted).
331. This presumption of causation is analogous to Soble's requirement of evidence necessary to raise a "rebuttable presumption" of causation. Soble, supra note
262, at 796. Soble's proposal, based on the Japanese experience, is addressed to the
compensation of harms resulting from currently generated pollution. Thus, he requires a claimant to show, inter alia, "that any manufacturer is currently or has been
engaging in any toxic substance pollution ..
." Id. Such a showing is not applicable
to our concerns since, as has been discussed, the generator of wastes deposited in a
landfill will frequently be unknown. See text accompanying notes 152-59 supra.
Soble would also require a showing that the pollution "(1) traveled through an indicated pathway from the point of manufacture to the injured or diseased person; and
(2) resulted in the etiology of the injury or disease claimed ....
Soble, supra, at
797 (emphasis in original). This latter requirement is, in our view, impractical. Cf.
S.1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). That bill proposed, with respect to the recovery
of medical expenses, that:
The inability of the claimant to demonstrate (1) the particular identity of the
substance which caused the injury or disease, (2) the particular source of
such substance, (3) the pathway of such substance en route to the injured
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In many instances information from health or environmental
3 32
agencies may be available to support this presumption.
The initial showing by the claimant would trigger an investigation by the Fund if sufficient information to substantiate the exposure to hazardous wastes had not already been developed by state
or local agencies. Information would be sought to determine
whether the claimant was exposed to a toxic substance or substances, the location of the substances, and the likelihood that they
contributed to the disease or injury. If the investigation by the
Fund showed that the claimant did have an injury or disease and
was exposed to a toxic substance or substances that could have
caused or substantially contributed to the injury or disease, the full
range of compensation would follow. If, as a result of the investigation, the Fund denied compensation, its report should be available
to the public and subject to limited judicial review. No adverse de-

termination would be final. A procedure should be created to reopen a claim upon the development of additional information. The
purpose of this procedure would be to administer the Fund as an
investigative agency, using its resources and expertise (or contracting for studies) to ascertain whether the alleged hazard existed, and to relieve the claimant of the traditional burden of proof.
As already discussed, the statute of limitations can present an
insurmountable obstacle to those injured by exposure to hazardous
wastes. 3 33 A compensation fund, as a continuing entity, obviates
the need for a statute of limitations, except, perhaps, to require
those who have suffered injury or disease to present their claims
within a reasonable period of time after the injury or disease and
exposure to a possible causative agent have been or should have
3 34
been discovered.
party, or (4) an explanation of the etiology of the substance in the injured

party, shall not bar recovery.
Id. § 4(c).

332. The President is authorized to use the Fund created by the CERCLA to
pay:
(4) the costs of epidemiologic studies, development and maintenance of a
registry of persons exposed to hazardous substances to allow long-term
health effect studies, and diagnostic services not otherwise available to determine whether persons in populations exposed to hazardous substances in
connection with a release or a suspected release are suffering from longlatency diseases ....
Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 111(c)(4), 94 Stat. 2767 (Dec. 11, 1980) (126 CONG. REC. S14,988,
14,996 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)).
333. See text accompanying notes 257-262 supra.
334. Claims for damages against the Fund proposed by S.1480, 96th Cong. 2d
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The administrative mechanism proposed eliminates many of the
traditional safeguards against compensating those who may not merit
compensation. While limiting proof to a showing of exposure and injury may result in compensating claimants whose injuries have other
causes, it can be assumed that many of those injured by hazardous
wastes will not make claims because they will be unaware of their
exposure. It is, of course, impossible to estimate the number of unknowing victims, just as it is impossible to estimate the number who
will be compensated for injuries resulting from other causes. It is
clear, however, that to require a high degree of certainty in the
compensatory process will defeat many legitimate claims, a result
which the authors feel is unequitable and undesirable.
CONCLUSION

The volume of hazardous wastes generated by industry and
the problems associated with their disposal suggest that the Love
Canal tragedy will not be an isolated or unique occurrence. Even if
the thousands of existing sites that pose immediate threats to public health or the environment receive remedial attention, future
threats to human health and the environment remain. Only the
most dedicated optimist could believe that the regulatory scheme
imposed by RCRA to manage the 50 to 60 million tons of hazardous wastes generated each year will prevent further incidents.
RCRA presumes continued land burial on the assumption that accidental discharges will not occur. Despite the naivete of this assumption, no mechanism exists, other than the vagaries of tort litigation, to provide redress for the substantial harms likely to result.
The courts are an unsatisfactory source of relief when a defendant cannot be identified or is financially unable to respond in
damages. Even if a responsible defendant can be found, it is difficult to prove that the cause of a disease is an unseen substance
unknowingly ingested at an indeterminate time. If proof of the defendant's negligence in disposing of the substance is also required,
the likelihood of recovery will be slight. Strict liability, as it is currently applied by a majority of courts, will not appreciably reduce
the injured party's evidentiary burden. At best, litigation arising
out of hazardous waste "events" will be lengthy, expensive, and
fraught with uncertainty.
Sess. (1980), were required to be presented "within six years from the date of the
discovery of the loss." Id. § 6(b)(3)(E) (126 CONG. REC. S14,938-48 (daily ed. Nov. 24,
1980)).
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A method of compensation is needed to obviate the need for a
culpable and financially responsible defendant, supersede traditional tort doctrines, and avoid the complexities of proof required
by the litigation process. The creation of such a compensatory
mechanism is justified by the likelihood that serious injury will be
suffered by large numbers of people having no other satisfactory
source of relief. If the mechanism takes the form of a fund maintained by a tax on waste generating industry, two objectives can be
achieved simultaneously: The swift and certain compensation of
those harmed by the byproducts of industrial activity and realistic
pricing of the end products of that activity, through cost
internalization.
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